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Unconscionability at the Gas Station
Ellen R. Jordan*
Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code permits courts
to relieve parties of contracts that are judicially determined to be
"unconscionable."' Although the section has been attacked as unintelligible and without "reality referent,"'2 it has also been defended
as a standard whose intentional imprecision encourages self-restraint
and promotes justice in commercial matters.3 But whether the imprecision is a result of poor drafting or is intentional, judicial interpretation is essential to flesh out the doctrine and make it more than
a ritual incantation. Like any abstraction, the term "unconscionability" must be defined by the process of judicial inclusion and
exclusion of concrete examples.
This Article examines judicial efforts to define the parameters of
unconscionability in one particular commercial setting: retail distribution of gasoline by oil companies. In so doing, this Article seeks to
determine, first, whether the doctrine of unconscionability, as applied, is operating appropriately, and, second, whether the benefits
thus far achieved through application of the doctrine in the name of
public policy have been worth the costs resulting from limiting freedom of contract.
I.

THE CONTOURS OF UNCONSCIONABILITY

A court applying the doctrine of unconscionability must reconcile the goal of enforcing freely made bargains with the notion that a
court of justice should not hold a party to a grossly unfair term, which
he could not exclude from the contract or of which he was justifiably
ignorant.' Long before the Uniform Commercial Code gave courts
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law.

1. U.C.C. § 2-302 provides,
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of
the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and
effect to aid the court in making the determination.

2. Leff, Unconscionabilityand the Code-The Emperor'sNew Clause, 115 U.PA.
L. REv. 485, 558 (1967).

3. See Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability,78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969).

4. There are a number of excellent commentaries on unconscionability. See, e.g.,
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authority to excise unconscionable terms or to refuse enforcement of
the contract altogether, the principle was established that a court of
equity would not grant specific enforcement of a contract that "no
man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one
hand, and.

. .

no honest and fair man would accept on the other." 5

When the case is not so extreme, however, the problem becomes
much more difficult.
Troublesome questions have arisen, particularly in modem contracting, where a bargain is often struck with respect to only the
critical variables of price, quantity, delivery date, and specific features of the product or service. One question arises when parties
having superior market power are able to extract highly favorable
terms from those who seek to deal with them. To what extent does
the Code scheme contemplate limitations on the use of that power?
A second question concerns the treatment that should be given terms
appearing, on forms that were signed but unread. The considerations
on both sides of this latter question center on reliance. Ought the
drafting party, who is often economically dominant, be entitled to
rely on the other's manifestation of assent and plan its affairs
accordingly? Or ought the signer be able to rely on the legal system
to ensure that his legitimate expectations, most often in the areas of
product quality and remedies, are not whittled away by artful
drafting? In short, given the realities of commerce, whose reliance is
more deserving of protection?
The drafters of the Code did not attempt a definition of unconscionability, assuming perhaps that, like obscenity,' it is more easily
recognized than defined. The official comments to section 2-302, however, indicate that the principle underlying the doctrine of unconscionability is the "prevention of oppression and unfair surprise...
and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power."' Of the two evils at which the doctrine is directed,
Ellinghaus, supra note 3; Leff, supranote 2; Murray, Unconscionability:Unconscionability, 31 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 1 (1969); Spanogle, Analyzing UnconscionabilityProblems,
117 U. PA. L. Rav. 931 (1969). There are three replies to the Murray article. Braucher,
The Unconscionable Contract or Term, 31 U. Prrr. L. REv. 337 (1970); Leff,
Unconscionabilityand the Crowd-Consumersand the Common Law Tradition, 31 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 349 (1970); Speidel, Unconscionability,Assent and ConsumerProtection,
31 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 359 (1970). See generally J. WHrrz& R. SumMmES, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 112-33 (1972).

5. Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch. 1751).
6. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
7. U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1. Professor Leff has suggested that unconscionability problems may result from either "procedural" or "substantive" abuses. Procedural unconscionability refers to imperfections in the process of obtaining assent;

substantive unconscionability refers to the effect of the term or contract on the disfavored party. See Leff, supra note 2, at 487. Unfair surprise is clearly a procedural
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unfair surprise has proved the easier to recognize and condemn; it
results from failure sufficiently to disclose important terms at the
time the contract is formed. This type of abuse is closely akin to
fraud, which the common law agreed would vitiate any assent.
The other evil, oppression, has proved more difficult to identify,
since courts and commentators have used the term in two different
ways. It is used to refer to a procedural abuse, refusal to bargain over
terms, which has been characterized as a lack of "meaningful
choice" 8 or "quasi-duress." ' But "oppression" is also used to refer to
a result that is substantively unconscionable regardless of how free
the bargaining."0 Under this result-oriented definition of oppression,
certain terms are voidable without regard to assent because they are
simply too harsh to enforce or, as common law courts would say, are
void as against public policy."
While eschewing any explicit definition of unconscionability, the
Code drafters were quite specific about the appropriate procedure for
making the determination. In addition to the Code's general emphasis on the importance of course of dealing and usage of trade as aids
in the interpretation of contractual terms, 2 it directs special attention to the commercial setting when charges of unconscionability are
abuse. See id. at 499-500. Oppression, on the other hand, has been treated as having
both procedural and substantive components. See text accompanying notes 8-10 infra.

8. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445,449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
9.

Leff, supra note 2, at 488, 499.

10. See Spanogle, supra note 4, at 948.
11.

The more narrow procedural approach to oppression would insulate the terms

of a fully negotiated agreement from judicial rewriting on the ground that section 2302 is designed to prevent unfair bargaining, not unfair bargains. Such a reading
comports with the disclaimer in the comments of any intention to meddle with the
results of superior bargaining power. See U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1.

Despite uncertainty about the thrust of the doctrine, however, the emerging consensus seems to be that unconscionability is not directed at bargaining per se: terms
written on the head of a pin about which no bargaining is possible will be enforceable
if they are reasonable and in line with ordinary expectations. Unless the terms produce

hardship, the bargaining process need not be scrutinized. See Murray, supra note 4,
at 24-25. Thus, some measure of substantive unconscionability, or harshness, will
always be part of the agreement. The more difficult question is whether a harsh term,
though procedurally impeccable-fully explained and disclosed-may be beyond the
bounds of "conscience" and legal enforcement. To this question, there is no clear
answer. Cases striking down extremely high prices as unconscionable are reviewed in

Spanogle, supra note 4, at 964-67. If the buyers in these cases in fact clearly understood
the prices, it may be that, at least in consumer transactions, even a procedurally

impeccable contract may be struck down on substantive grounds. But given that the
total price in these cases included credit terms that may not have been sufficiently
disclosed, see, e.g., American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435, 201
A.2d 886 (1964), perhaps the bargaining process with respect to price was not procedurally adequate.

12. See U.C.C. § 1-205.
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raised. Section 2-302(2) provides that a court may decide a question
of unconscionability only after affording all parties a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to the commercial setting, purpose,
and effect of the challenged contract or term.' 3 Moreover, the test to
be applied is "whether, in the light of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the
clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the
circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract.""
Thus, it is clear that courts are to determine whether a given term
constitutes bad faith or overreaching by reference to accepted commercial standards. In this way, the Code seeks to ensure that the
legitimate expectations and needs of business will be considered before a contract is modified or abrogated in the name of public policy.
Courts have thus far proceeded with caution in upsetting commercial arrangements as unconscionable. Some have hesitated to
undertake the wide-ranging inquiry into commercial practice and
needs mandated by the Code, suggesting that the task is more properly one for the legislature.' 5 Courts have also stressed the danger of
second-guessing knowledgeable commercial negotiators whose assessment of the fairness of the forms they sign is probably as accurate as
that of even the most conscientious jurist, who has struggled to understand the commercial context." Hence, except in the consumer
setting, where practices clearly bordering on fraud or true duress
create special problems,'7 courts have generally permitted businessmen to enforce even form contracts.' 8 Indeed, in those rare cases in
which unconscionability has been found in merchant-to-merchant
transactions, 9 commentators have not hesitated to criticize the results as economically dysfunctional and unwise. 2'
13. The text of section 2-302(2) appears at note 1 supra.
14. U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1.

15. See, e.g., Division of Triple T Serv., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 60 Misc. 2d 720,
723, 304 N.Y.S.2d 191, 204 (Sup. Ct. 1969), aff'd mem., 34 App. Div. 2d 618, 311
N.Y.S.2d 961 (1970); William C. Cornitius, Inc. v. Wheeler, 276 Or. 747, 556 P.2d 666,
669-70 (1976).
16. See, e.g., In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864, 871 (E.D. Pa. 1966)
("To hold these contracts unenforceable on their face would probably be to impose a
judicially invented but economically dysfunctional morality upon knowledgeable contracting parties.").

17. See Wright, The Courts Have Failed the Poor, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1969,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 26.
18. See J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 4, at 114 & n.11.

19. See, e.g., Granite Worsted Mills, Inc. v. Aaronson Cowen, Ltd., 29 App. Div.
2d 303, 287 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1968), rev'd on other grounds, 25 N.Y.2d 451, 255 N.E.2d
168, 306 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1969); Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Umberto, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 1181
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970).
20. See, e.g., Comment, Unconscionable Business Contracts:A Doctrine Gone
Awry, 70 YALE L.J. 453 (1961) (criticizing Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S.
85 (1955) (admiralty decision voiding a contractual term as against public policy)).
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A general assessment of unconscionability in the context of
purely commercial transactions is beyond the scope of this Article.
Instead, the Article focuses on the emergence of one commercial litigant who has successfully claimed protection against an unconscionable contract or term-the service station operator. Rejecting the presumption that businessmen can take care of their own interests, four
courts have seen parallels between the plight of the consumer faced
with take-it-or-leave-it form contracts and that of these particular
entrepreneurs. These courts did not hesitate to reform the contracts
in question, characterizing terms in various service station lease arrangements as "oppressive," "contrary to public policy," or "unfair."
This Article examines the conclusions reached in these cases to determine whether they were warranted by the language of the Code.
II.

INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND

The major integrated oil companies have relied heavily on the
independent dealer to distribute gasoline to the motoring public. '
Although the companies avoid the "franchise" label,2 their dealer
arrangements fit within the accepted broad definition of franchising.
In general terms a franchise is a contractual arrangement between a
company with an established trademark, product, or service (or all
three) and an independently managed outlet. The individually owned
or leased business is operated as though it were part of a large chain,
with standardized services, products, trademarks, uniforms, equipment, and design.?
While fitting within this broad description, gasoline marketing
differs significantly from other franchise operations .2 For example,
unlike the operator of a McDonald's restaurant outlet, the operator
of a gas station may have less interest in selling the franchised products than does the supplying company. The company sees the station
as its means of selling petroleum products, with price competition
and high volume as keys to profit. The dealer, in contrast, often sees
the station primarily as his repair and maintenance operation. Since
the bulk of his income tends to come from automotive services that
he, not the oil company, provides, he is less concerned than the com21. For a history of the dealer concept in petroleum distribution, see F. ALLviNE
& J. PATrERSON, CoMPErmON, LTD.: THE MARErING OF GASOLINE 26-28 (1972).
22. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AD Hoc COMMrrEE ON FRANCHISING, REPORT 7
(1969) [hereinafter cited as FTC REPORT], reprinted in PRACTCING LAW INSTITUTE,
FRANCHISING

185 (Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 33,

1970).
23.

See E. ScHwARTZ, BUSINESS EXPANSION

THROUGH FRANCHISING 8

(1973).

24. See generally Oxenfeldt & Thompson, Franchising in Perspective, J.
RETAILING, Winter 1968-1969, at 3-13.
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pany about increasing sales of the relatively low-profit gasoline 5
Moreover, though some agreements do specify a maximum rent,
rental rates are often based on a percentage of gasoline sales,2 6 in
effect giving the dealer a negative incentive. This disparity between'
the interests of the company and the operator simply does not exist
where both are exclusively interested in selling the same product and
splitting the profits.
Another factor distinguishing these arrangements from other
franchise operations, and potentially giving significance to the difference in emphases between the operators and the oil companies, is the
retention by the oil company of control over the station properties."
To avoid the problems of supervision, payroll, and exposure to maximum tort liability for a far-flung distribution network,2s as well as to
avoid some local taxes, 2 oil companies lease stations to dealers rather
than operate them directly. Until recently, industry practice was to
keep dealers on short-term leases, usually terminable by the company
on short notice and without showing cause." Unlike other franchising
arrangements, no elaborate franchise agreement sets out reciprocal
rights and duties," and the resulting precariousness of the dealer's
position is the root of many dealer complaints. In addition, dealers
charge that the ever-present threat of termination, which would
mean destruction of their entire business, enables the oil companies
to exert undue control over the way gasoline and other petroleum
products are sold to the public. 2
25. See Ulman, Service Stations Give Oil Firms Tough Fight over Gas-Only
Outlets, Wall St. J., June 16, 1977, at 1, col. 6.
26. See Brown, Franchising-AFiduciaryRelationship,49 Tax. L. Rav. 650, 656
(1971).
27. This Article focuses on that segment of the industry composed of dealers who
lease their business from a major oil company. These dealers comprise roughly thirty
percent of all service station operators. W. JOHNSON, R. MESSICK, S. VAN VACTOR, & F.
WYANT, COMPETITION IN THE OIL INDUSTRY 11 (1976).

28. See Comment, Dealer Franchising in the Gasoline Industry: Current
Developments, 4 U.S.F. L. Rev. 65, 66 (1969).

29.

See F. ALLviNE & J. PATTERSON,
25 (1974).

HIGHWAY ROBBERY: AN ANALYSIS OF TE GASo-

LINE CRISIS

30. See, e.g., FTC Industry Conference on Marketing of Automotive Gasoline:
Hearings Pursuantto H. Res. 13 Before Subcomm. No. 4 on DistributionProblems of
the House Select Comm. on Small Business, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 332 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as FTC Industry Conference]. In some states dealers are now protected by statute. See note 86 infra and accompanying text. In addition, the oil companies themselves have offered longer leases, perhaps discovering that the better dealers
insist on more security before investing time and energy in a station operation. See
FTC Industry Conference, supra at 561.
31. See FTC REPORT, supra note 22, at 7.
32. Hearings on S. 2507 & S. 2321 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1967).
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Given these conditions, two sharply divergent views of the relationship between the oil companies and their dealers are advanced.
Organized dealers" and their advocate, the Federal Trade Commission,31 portray the dealer as an economic serf, under the thumb of his
lessor-supplier and afraid to step out of line in the pricing or purchasing of recommended brands of tires, batteries, and accessories because of the ever-present threat of termination. Based upon that
view, the Supreme Court held an agreement between Texaco and
Goodrich, whereby Goodrich paid Texaco a commission on Goodrich
tires, batteries, and accessories bought by Texaco dealers, to be anticompetitive, although there was no evidence of overt coercion on the
part of Texaco.3 The Court found that the power imbalance in the
relationship between Texaco and its dealers was enough to make this
sales-commission system "inherently coercive":" "'A man operating
a gas station is bound to be overawed by the great corporation that
is his supplier, his banker, and his landlord.' "37
Complementary to this view is the theory that oil companies
have traditionally used the vast profits derived from control of crude
oil production to subsidize their "downstream" operations." As a
result, the companies could afford to terminate even a good dealer if
he proved uncooperative. According to this view, the individual
dealer was expendable and could be ruthlessly cut off to stamp out
any pricing or purchasing independence on his part." The squeeze on
oil company profits caused by the end of the oil depletion allowance
and rising prices for foreign oil, far from making dealerships more
valuable and more secure, has only intensified oil company pressure
on the individual stations to pay their own way and has aggravated
the conflict between dealers and the companies."0
The oil companies paint quite a different picture. They note that
a major oil company dealership is often an attractive prospect for the
person who wants his own business. The oil companies have already
invested in the land and equipment, 1 and are willing to finance a
33.

See, e.g., FTC Industry Conference, supra note 30, at 228.

34.

See FEDERAL TRADE COMMSSION, REPORT ON ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES IN
THE MARKNG OF GASOLINE (1967).
35. See FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968).
36. Id. at 229.
37. Id. at 227 (quoting Shell Oil Co. v. FTC, 360 F.2d 470, 487 (5th Cir. 1966)
(Wisdom, J.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967)).
38. See F. ALLviNE & J. PATrERSON, supra note 29, at 79. But see W. JOHNSON,
R. MzssicK, S. VAN VAcrOR, & F. WYANT, supra note 27, at 41-48.
39. See FTC Industry Conference, supra note 30, at 228-29.
40. See Roche, Major Oil Firms Seek Earnings on Gasoline, Long a "Loss
Leader," Wall St. J., Mar. 28, 1977, at 1, col. 6.
41. "A metropolitan or interstate location today represents a minimum average
investment of $225,000 in land, buildings and equipment. This amount increases sig-
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large part of the new dealer's initial investment.42 That investment
itself is relatively modest, compared to the sums necessary to obtain
other automotive service franchises 3 or a fast-food franchise." The
dealer gets extensive training," and takes over a fully equipped station with an established brand, a credit card system that costs the
dealer nothing,4" and rental terms that are far below the fair market
value of the site.4"
The companies also stress that they are in business to maximize
profits and thus they challenge the theory that they are willing to lose
money at the retail end.48 They point out that a struggling, inefficient
dealer, who is identified by the public with the company, gives the
entire operation a "black eye." 49 More serious, he is usually a collection problem and a drain on overall profitability." A good dealer who
builds his business is therefore very valuable to the company, which
makes every effort to assist and support him. The companies point
out that many of their dealers have had long, harmonious relationships with the same company9 ' and also assert that competent dealers
are at a premium, often being enticed away by competing suppliers.2
Thus, the companies deny that the dealer is a fungible serf. Rather,
nificantly depending on the value of the real estate." Letter from Keith E. Parks,
Attorney for The Gulf Companies, to author (Aug. 19, 1977) (on file at M

EOTA LAw

REviEw).
42. Today the initial investment averages between $13,000 and $14,000. In addition, "presently, banks are eager to make loans to dealers because of the ability of
dealers to make substantial profits in today's market." Although in the past Gulf
offered start-up accommodation loans to as many as fifty percent of its new dealers,
currently only five percent request such assistance. Id.
43. For example, to obtain an Aamco Transmission franchise, a franchisee must
invest at least $26,000. See 1977 DIRECTORY OF FRANCHISING ORGANIZATIONs 7. To become a Midas Muffler dealer requires $85,000. See id. at 10.

44. A McDonald's restaurant franchise requires an initial investment of
$190,000. See id. at 32.
45. For example, a new Humble Oil dealer gets a six-week training program paid
for by the company. See FTC Industry Conference, supra note 30, at 559 (testimony
of W.W. Bryan, Humble Oil & Refining Co.).

46. To participate in bank chargecard plans, a merchant must pay a fee of three
to six percent of the retail price of merchandise purchased with the card.
47. Interview with Keith E. Parks, Attorney for The Gulf Companies, in Atlanta,
Georgia (July 20, 1977).

48. Their question is a simple one: if retail sales are eating up the profits from
exploration and production, why not concentrate exclusively on the profit-making end
and get out of retailing?
49. See Gregor, Who Wants a Black Eye?, in PTRnoLuMARKETING

AND

TRANSPORTATION 161 (1964).

50.
Atlanta,
51.
52.

Interview with J.D. Moon, Division Attorney for Tenneco Oil Company, in
Georgia (July 19, 1977).
See, e.g., FTC Industry Conference, supra note 30, at 546.
See id. at 561.
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they claim that the success of each dealer is an important marketing
goal and that only after a dealer has fallen hopelessly behind in his
payments or become the source of customer complaints does termination result.
Regardless of which picture is closer to reality, there is no doubt
that dealers, both individually and as a group, are challenging oil
company contracting policies. 3 On paper, the dealers appear to have
a number of powerful weapons. 4 Terminated dealers have gotten
some relief by alleging that the termination is part of an anticompetitive program on the part of the supplier. If, in fact, the dealer has
been terminated because he asserts independence from his supplier
in pricing, or because he refuses to purchase recommended brands of
accessories, the oil company's exercise of its termination rights may
be a violation of the antitrust laws. 5
In reality, however, the dealer resisting termination probably
wishes to use the threat of an antitrust action as a bargaining chip
in his negotiations with the company. His real interest is to continue
the relationship, not to have it declared illegal. The value of that chip
is diminished, however, because antitrust litigation is complex,
costly, and lengthy, presenting difficult questions of proof. For the
dealer whose lease has been terminated, the antitrust remedy may be
remote or unobtainable and at best a poor substitute for the business
he has worked long and hard to build. Recognizing this reality, some
courts have granted injunctive relief to prevent termination during
the trial of dealer antitrust claims," thus easing the dealer's immedi53. See Ulman, supra note 25.

54. One weapon that has not proven particularly effective is the use of traditional
contract law remedies. Although the equities may be compelling for the dealer who

seeks to challenge his supplier's use of its reserved power to terminate its lease-sales
arrangement, the dealer did freely enter into the agreement and thus is left with the

problem of convincing a court that he should be permitted to complain that the
contract he signed voluntarily is too harsh. Even the Uniform Commercial Code, with
its emphasis on good faith and fair dealing, recognizes the parties' right to reserve

termination rights in a sales contract by agreement, although the Code does require
notification to avoid unconscionability. See U.C.C. § 2-309(2)-(3). For a thorough
analysis of the inapplicability of traditional contract remedies to the termination question, see Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights-Franchise
Cancellations,1967 DuKE L.J. 465.

55. See, e.g., FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968). Although a detailed
discussion of the various antitrust theories is beyond the scope of this Article, it bears
noting that potential treble damage liability makes the antitrust weapon a potent one
for the dealer. An overview of antitrust and its relationship to petroleum marketing,

although now somewhat out-of-date, is provided in Emmerglick, Legislative Restrictions on Marketing, in PMaoLUM

MA KEING AND TiNSPORTAT1ON

85 (1964). For a

more current assessment of antitrust and its relationship to franchise terminations
generally, see Bohling, FranchiseTerminationsUnder the ShermanAct: Populism and
RelationalPower, 53 Tax. L. Rav. 1180 (1975).
56. See, e.g., Phillips v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 376 F. Supp. 1250 (D.
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ate problem of how to survive economically until his claim is heard.
But if the dealer is really seeking to stay in business, he may be
disappointed to find that courts often characterize the generous antitrust remedies as adequate and7 are reluctant to decree that the oil
company must deal with him.1
Additionally, if efforts to negotiate about a termination fail and
the dealer finds himself the defendant in a state court action brought
to enforce the lease, he may find it difficult, if not impossible, to use
his antitrust claim defensively. Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over cases brought under the federal antitrust statutes, 8 thus
making it impossible for the dealer to assert in state court an antitrust counterclaim based on federal law." Furthermore, removal of
the entire controversy to federal court is not an option under present
law,6" and federal courts are reluctant to interfere with any pending
state action, even if the two suits deal with the same transaction and
the parties may be subjected to inconsistent determinations."
The antitrust bargaining chip is more likely to be effective if
dealers can assert their claims collectively. Modem procedural rules
provide a very potent weapon for the individually powerless dealers:
the class action.2 The spectre of awesome damage recoveries encourMd. 1973); Pickerign v. Pasco Marketing, Inc., 303 Minn. 442, 228 N.W.2d 562 (1975);
Amerada Hess Corp. v. Quinn, 143 N.J. Super. 237, 362 A.2d 1258 (Law Div. 1976).
57. The issue is a lively one, as the history of the litigation between Mobil Oil
Corporation and Paul Rubenfeld illustrates. When Mobil tried to end its relationship
with Rubenfeld at the expiration of his lease, Rubenfeld refused to vacate the premises.
Mobil sought to recover possession, but the trial court found Mobil guilty of anticompetitive practices and refused to enforce Mobil's property rights. See Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Rubenfeld, 72 Misc. 2d 392, 339 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Civ. Ct. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 77
Misc. 2d 962, 357 N.Y.S.2d 589 (App. Term 1974) (one judge dissenting), rev'd, 48 App.
Div. 2d 428, 370 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1975) (one judge dissenting), aff'd mem., 40 N.Y.2d
936, 358 N.E.2d 882, 390 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1976) (one judge dissenting) (Mobil should
recover its property, regardless of possible violations of the antitrust laws).
58. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976). These sections have been
interpreted to give federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over antitrust claims. See
Cream Top Creamery v. Dean Milk Co., 383 F.2d 358 (6th Cir. 1967).
59. See, e.g., Reed Enterprises, Inc. v. Books, Inc., 110 R.I. 179, 183, 291 A.2d
261, 263 (1972).
60. See, e.g., Potter v. Carvel Stores of N.Y., Inc., 203 F. Supp. 462 (D. Md.
1962), aff'd per curiam, 314 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1963).
61. See, e.g., Response of Carolina v. Leasco Response, Inc., 498 F.2d 314 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1050 (1974); Red Rock Cola Co. v. Red Rock Bottlers, Inc.,
195 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1952).
62. In Milonas v. Amerada Hess Corp., [1976] 2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
61,069
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), class certification was granted to all present and former Hess lesseedealers, and in Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
98 S. Ct. 1280 (1978), the Third Circuit held that certification should not have been
denied to a class composed of all present and former lessee-dealers of fifteen major oil

19781

UNCONSCIONABILITY

ages the companies to negotiate and offer out-of-court settlements.
If an oil company argues that class action treatment is inappropriate,
and loses, the dealers gain the upper hand. In a class action suit
against Clark Oil and Refining Corporation, for example, the dealers
were able to force a complete restructuring of their business relationship. Counsel for the dealers made clear that the one-sided lease
agreement had been their primary target from the beginning, and the
settlement agreed to by Clark vastly increased dealer protection
against termination. 3 But such class actions have often foundered on
the preliminary procedural shoals of achieving class certification,"4
making them an inadequate answer to dealer grievances.
Dealers have recently opened a new front in the battle against
termination, basing their attack on federal legislation designed to
manage the shortage of petroleum products triggered by the Arab oil
embargo."5 They pointed out that one of the stated purposes of the
legislation is "to preserve the competitive viability of . . .branded
independent marketers," 6 defined to include those "independents"
engaged in distribution and marketing who are tied to a refiner 67by a
real estate lease, trademark use agreement, or supply contract.
Basically, the federal scheme contemplates that each supplier
allocate available petroleum products among those customers it was
serving during the statutory base period," provided those customers
are conducting an on-going business.6 In order to guard against circumvention of this objective by less obvious means, the regulations
prohibit modification of normal business practices 7 -such as suddenly cutting off credit to a purchaser the supplier would prefer to
drop-as well as retaliation against a purchaser for claiming an allo7
cation. '
companies, despite the fact that such a class would include between one hundred
thousand and two million plaintiffs. See generally Herrmann v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
65 F.R.D. 585, 589-93 (1974), motion to decertify class denied, 72 F.R.D. 182, 184-85
(W.D. Pa. 1976).
63. See In re Clark Oil & Ref. Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 422 F. Supp. 503, 505
(E.D. Wis. 1976). In state court the dealers had unsuccessfully raised their claims as
defenses to summary repossession proceedings. See Clark Oil Corp. v. Leistikow, 69
Wis. 2d 226, 230 N.W.2d 736 (1975).
64. See, e.g., Peltier v. Exxon Corp., 527 F.2d 757, 760 (9th Cir. 1975); Shaw v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 60 F.R.D. 566, 570-71 (D.N.H. 1973); Lah v. Shell Oil Co., 50 F.R.D.
198 (S.D. Ohio 1970).

65. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-756 (1976).
66. Id. § 753(b)(1)(D).
67. See id. § 752(1).
68. See 10 C.F.R. § 211.9(a) (1977).
69. See id. § 211.11(a).
70. See id. § 210.62(a).

71. See id. § 210.61.
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Dealers have invoked the protection of these provisions to resist
termination, but thus far have not had much success.72 In deciding
such cases, courts have relied heavily on the fact that although dealer
protection provisions that would have prohibited termination except
for good cause were included in the Senate version of the bill, 73 these
provisions were eventually deleted.74 Therefore, dealers attempting to
use the allocation legislation to block termination are faced with the
fact that the full Congress declined to regulate lease terminations
directly. 75 The burden of proof on the issues of retaliation and departure from normal business practices has been placed on the dealer, 7
and iew have successfully met it. In fact, the reported cases typically77
involve dealers whose payments for gasoline or rent are in arrears,
and who have been given support and encouragement by their suppliers for considerable periods of time before the relationship is
severed.
Because their individual economic weakness puts them at such
a disadvantage in dealing with or litigating against the oil companies,
the dealers have followed a pattern described in a classic study of the
relationship between automobile manufacturers and their franchised
dealers. 71 Initially, dealers organized into associations that interceded
with oil companies on their behalf.79 When such collective private
action failed to provide the necessary protection the dealers began to
take their case to government, seeking both administrative and legislative help. Although they have little economic strength, their numbers and wide geographic dispersal give them impressive political
strength both to influence legislation and to enlist the aid of an administrative agency."0 The Federal Trade Commission has long been
72. See Vold v. Marathon Oil Co., 407 F. Supp. 1011 (W.D. Ky. 1975); Burk v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 397 F. Supp. 421 (D. Mont. 1975); Russell v. Shell Oil Co., 382 F. Supp.
395 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd mem., 497 F.2d 924 (6th Cir. 1974); Guyer v. Cities Serv. Co.,
381 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Wis. 1974). But see Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., No. 74-1819
(4th Cir., Apr. 1, 1975) (affirming grant of preliminary injunction restraining terminations pending outcome of litigation).
73. See H.R. REP. No. 628, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 31, reprinted in [1973] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2688, 2707.
74. The legislative history was thoroughly reviewed in Guyer v. Cities Serv.
Co., 381 F. Supp. 7, 10-11 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
75. "[The deletion of the 'dealer protection' provisions of the Senate bill compels this Court to conclude that Congress was not attempting to regulate lease terminations by passing the Act." Id. at 11.
76. See id. at 13.
77. In Burk v. Gulf Oil Co., 397 F. Supp. 421, 422 (D. Mont. 1975), for example,
Gulf claimed that the dealer owed $8,370.50 for merchandise and had refused to surrender Gulf equipment valued at $4,277.00.

78. See S.
79.
80.
(1969).

MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BmANCE OF

PowER (1966).

See FTC Industry Conference, supra note 30, at 232.
See Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 47, 83-84
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interested in their problems. 1 Charging that short leaseholds are
sometimes used to impose tie-ins, price-fixing, and other anticompetitive practices on the dealers, the Commission has taken vigorous
action against the oil companies.8 2 In fact, Phillips Petroleum Company and Standard Oil Company (Ohio) have consented to decrees
proposed by the Federal Trade Commission that provide substantial
dealer protection from unreasonably short leaseholds and arbitrary
terminations.Y
Organized dealers have also lobbied for "good cause" statutes
that would limit the franchisor's power to terminate by setting objective standards. Although Congress repeatedly refusedto afford dealers protection of this sort,84 the dealers have had some success in the
states."' Congress has recently responded to the dealers' demands
with the promise of a day in court under the newly passed Petroleum
Marketing Practices Act. 8 Such political success may, in turn, have
contributed to the recent judicial willingness to regulate contracts
between dealers and oil companies on public policy grounds.
This impressive array of remedies may seem more than adequate
to deal with dealer complaints. But antitrust litigation is complicated
by the need to struggle with the intricacies of market definition and
esoteric arguments drawn from economic theory, and many dealer
81. See generally FTC REPORT, supra note 22.
82. For example, the FTC brought suit against a number of oil companies and
tire manufacturers because of agreements whereby gasoline dealers were encouraged
to carry a particular brand of tire. See FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968);
Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
83. See Phillips Petroleum Co., 84 F.T.C. 1666 (1974); Wall St. J., July 15, 1977,
at 22, col. 4.
84. See S. 1694, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REc. 27082 (1974). That bill
passed the Senate, but Congress took no further action on the issue. On June 20, 1975,
the Senate passed an act for fair marketing of petroleum products. See S. 323, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 20012-16 (1975).
85. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 106-1101 to -1112 (Supp. 1977); N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAW §§ 199-a to -j (McKinney Supp. 1978). In other states, more general regulation of
franchises also protects gasoline dealers. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-133e
to -133g (West Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2551-2556 (1974); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 56:10-1 to -12 (West Supp. 1977). In 1977, the Georgia Association of Petroleum Retailers, Inc. obtained passage of an amendment to the Georgia Gasoline Marketing Practices Act, GA. CODE ANN. § § 106-1101 to -1112 (Supp. 1977), that provided,
inter alia,that deglers could refuse to remain open more than six days a week or twelve
hours a day without breaching their agreements. It also provided for equitable relief.
See H.B. 78, 1977 Ga. Gen. Assem. Governor Busbee vetoed the bill, citing the adverse
effect on public convenience and also constitutional questions of impairment of existing contracts. See Message Accompanying Veto No. 2 (Mar. 31, 1977) (on file at
MiNNESOTA LAW REviEw).
86. Pub. L. No. 95-297, 92 Stat. 322 (1978). Section 105(b)(1) of the act authorizes equitable relief to compel continuation or renewal of the contract. See S. REP. No.
731, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 40-41 (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1651, 1677; H. REP. No. 161, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1977). The new legislation
may, however, merely have federalized the unconscionability problem between dealers
and suppliers. See note 206 infra.
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problems are too immediate to await governmental action. Thus,
dealers have seized upon the doctrine of unconscionability as a basis
for challenging burdensome contract terms. Building upon precedents set by cases involving consumers, they have stressed the vulnerability of dealers and their need for protection against the giant
oil companies. They have also impressed upon the courts the similarity of service station operators to consumers in terms of marginal
education, legal na'vet6, and lack of business acumen.
As mentioned previously, the Uniform Commercial Code stipulates that, in determining unconscionability, courts are to consider
the commercial realities of the market and the reasonable commercial expectations of both parties. This provides one basis on which the
oil companies might justify the terms of their dealer contracts. Perhaps underestimating the appeal of the dealer/consumer analogy,
however, the oil companies thus far seem to have failed to argue this
position effectively, attempting to rely on their carefully drafted documents instead of arguing the realities of commerce.
I.

RESERVED TERMINATION RIGHTS MODIFIED

The Supreme Court of New Jersey, source of the landmark opinion in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.," was receptive to
claims of unconscionability in the service station setting as well. Continuing its scrutiny of contracts signed on a "take-it-or-leave-it"
basis, in Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello,mthe New Jersey court sided with
a dealer protesting the oil company-lessor's attempt to terminate
the relationship.
The dealer, Frank Marinello, had been operating a Shell station
in Fort Lee, New Jersey, for thirteen years. The most recent agreement between the parties consisted of a three-year lease of the premises, renewable yearly thereafter. The lease was subject to termination by the operator at any time on at least ninety days' notice, and
by Shell at the end of any term by giving at least thirty days' notice.
In addition, a dealer agreement committed Shell to supply its products to the dealer for resale. The dealer agreement could be terminated by Shell at any time on ten days' notice.
Six weeks before the end of the three-year term, Shell gave written notice that neither the lease nor the dealer agreement would be
renewed. Thereupon, Marinello filed suit to enjoin Shell from terminating and to reform the contract to provide that the relationship
continue unless Shell could show that it had good cause to end it.
After the lease expired, Shell filed a summary dispossess complaint
87.
88.

32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974).
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to evict Marinello. The two cases were consolidated and tried together. 9
At the outset, the trial court faced the issue of the applicability
of the state's newly enacted Franchise Practices Act." That statute
prohibits a franchisor from terminating or failing to renew a franchise
without good cause, which is defined as "failure by the franchisee to
substantially comply with those requirements imposed upon him by
the franchise."" Based on the legislative history, the trial court found
that the statute was not intended to apply to this agreement, which
had been executed before the effective date of the Act.9" But, based
on the dealings between the parties, Shell's own practice, and considerations of public policy, the trial court found an implied covenant
not to terminate without good cause and reformed the instrument to
make that covenant explicit."
One basic question confronting the court was whether to limit
the inquiry to reading and enforcing the very explicit written document or to look beyond the document to determine the parties' true
agreement-the basic issue that underlies the parol evidence rule.
The court must have resolved this issue in favor of the nondrafting
party, allowing him to challenge the writing's completeness.
Although the trial court did not cite the Uniform Commercial
Code, perhaps viewing its decision as involving property law, its
method of determining the parties' agreement would have been approved by the Code drafters. In deciding whether to reform the written instruments, the court considered the history of the relationship
between the parties, which the Code labels "course of dealing." 4 The
court pointed to the representations made by Shell at the outset that
Marinello's future was with Shell if he "built up" the station." Both
89. The facts are more fully reported in the trial court opinion. See Shell Oil Co.
v. Marinello, 120 N.J. Super. 357, 294 A.2d 253 (Law Div. 1972), modified, 63 N.J. 402,
307 A.2d 598 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974).
90. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:10-1 to -12 (West Supp. 1977).
91. Id. § 56:10-5.
92. See 120 N.J. Super. at 370, 294 A.2d at 260. Aside from the legislative intention, any attempt to apply the statute retroactively would have raised serious constitutional questions. Attempts to legislate good cause requirements retroactively have been
held to contravene the federal constitutional prohibition against passage of any "Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see Note,
Constitutional Obstacles to State "Good Cause" Restrictions on Franchise
Terminations, 74 COLUM. L. Rxv. 1487 (1974). Closely related are due process objections. See Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 423 F.2d 563 (1st Cir.), rev'd per curiam, 400
U.S. 41 (1970) (on abstention grounds); Globe Liquor Co. v. Four Roses Distillers Co.,
281 A.2d 19 (Del.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 873 (1971).
93. See 120 N.J. Super. at 377, 294 A.2d at 264.
94. U.C.C. § 1-205(1).
95. See 120 N.J. Super. at 373, 294 A.2d at 262.
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Shell's announced policy of no terminations except for good cause
and Shell's previous conduct in renewing leases with Marinello and
others colored the agreement between the two parties. The court thus
followed the drafters' admonition that "the meaning of the agreement
of the parties is to be determined by the language used by them and
by their action, read and interpreted in the light of commercial practices and other surrounding circumstances.""8 Given this "course of
dealing," the trial court found that the instrument did not reflect the
shared understanding of the parties.Y
Moreover, the court was hesitant to enforce an agreement in
which Shell's superior bargaining position had allowed the company
to dictate the written terms of the arrangement, giving the dealer
little choice, especially when the legislature had so recently declared
a strong public interest in the fairness of gasoline distribution arrangements. The public policy considerations expressed in the recently enacted statute, in addition to the long-standing course of
dealing between the parties, allowed the trial court to remake the
agreement in conformity with the true understanding of the parties,
an understanding that coincided with general notions of fairness.
Turning to whether Shell had demonstrated good cause to terminate,
the trial court found that Marinello had substantially complied with
his obligations, both written and implied. Hence, Shell had no cause
to terminate."
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, while agreeing with the result, went one step further. That court found that public policy alone
provided sufficient grounds to modify the parties' written agreement.
Regardless of company policy or practice, an implied limitation on
termination-that no such arrangement be terminated without good
cause-would be read into the agreement, placed there not by the
legislature or the parties, but by the court acting in the public interest."
While the supreme court's approach is commendably candid in
that it revealed the true basis for its action, the trial court's more
particularized inquiry is less of a break with the traditional emphasis
on freedom of contract. The trial court did not purport to change
every gasoline station lease, but only the one sub judice, and did so
based on the voluntary statements and actions of the parties thereto.
Under this approach, subsequent dealers seeking to modify contractual terms would, like Marinello, first have to show that the written
96. U.C.C. § 1-205, Comment 1 (emphasis added).
97. See 120 N.J. Super. at 371-78, 294 A.2d at 260-64.
98. See id. at 378-85, 294 A.2d at 264-68.
99. See Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 63 N.J. 402, 410-11, 307 A.2d 598, 603 (1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974).
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agreement did not accurately reflect their total agreement. To the
extent that dealers could demonstrate that the actual agreement differed from the written contract, they might be able to counteract the
dominant oil company's control of the written terms. At the same
time, the trial court left basically undisturbed the right of contracting
parties to shape their relationship without governmental direction as
to individual terms. Under the trial court's approach, considerations
of public policy would be relevant only if the initial inquiry revealed
that the written agreement did not reflect what the parties in fact
intended and the court determined that, in order to protect the reasonable expectations of both parties without imposing undue hardship on either, it must reform the contract.' ®
One crucial step was omitted, however, in the trial court's reasoning: although the parties may well have intended that their relationship would continue absent good cause to end it, the court did
not directly address the parties' expectations about how a dispute
concerning good cause would be resolved. Based on prevailing commercial practices at the time the agreement was entered into, a plausible argument can be made that both parties assumed that Shell
would determine what constituted good cause. Presumably, Marinello assumed that Shell would be anxious to retain a good dealer as
an effective salesman of its products; thus, his success as a station
operator would protect him against termination. At the time Marinello became a Shell dealer, however, abuse of short-term leaseholds to keep dealers in line was already well known and had been
the subject of dealer complaints to the Federal Trade Commission. 1 '
Moreover, it is unlikely that Shell would knowingly volunteer to
submit its business judgment to judicial review. Thus, it might be
argued that Marinello, by accepting a limited leasehold notwithstanding the potential for abuse, knowingly assumed two risks: that
he and Shell might disagree about whether he was a good dealer,
and that if a dispute arose Shell would be free to substitute another
dealer that it felt could do better.
In treating the good cause limitation and the nonrenewal clause
as judicially enforceable, the trial court made the existence of good
cause a question to be decided by the trier of fact. Since this position
seems contrary to the shared expectations of the parties at the time
the agreementwas consummated, the trial court went beyond mere
interpretation of the parties' agreement in reaching its result and
instead entered the realm of judicial regulation of contractual relationships in the name of public policy.
Under article I of the Uniform Commercial Code, a duty of good
100. See 120 N.J. Super. at 377-78, 294 A.2d at 264.
101. See notes 30-32 supra and accompanying text.
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faith is read into every commercial transaction." 2 In the case of a
merchant, good faith incorporates the standards of fairness observed
03
in his trade,"
providing an objective yardstick against which to measure conduct. Because all contractual rights must be exercised in
good faith, some judicial review of discretion is always available.'
But the good faith obligation traditionally has not carried a terminated dealer very far in challenging his termination. 5 Indeed, the
Code itself seems to consider the obligation of good faith satisfied if
reasonable notification of a decision to end a relationship is given."'
Marinello was told in February that his lease would not be renewed
five months later and received formal written notice six weeks prior
to the expiration of the lease. It appears that Shell asserted an honest
and reasonable belief that it would make more money with another
dealer, and thus it satisfied its obligation to treat Marinello with good
faith.
Both the trial court and the New Jersey Supreme Court, however, determined that more than a traditional good faith requirement
should be imposed on the contracting parties. The trial court found
that by its established practices Shell had modified its written absolute right to end the relationship upon adequate notice and had
agreed to a judicially enforceable good cause limitation. 7 Going one
step further, the supreme court imposed this modification of reserved
termination rights as a matter of public policy, without regard to the
actual expectations of the parties.
Under the good cause limitation imposed by the supreme court
in Marinello, a franchising oil company wishing to sever its relationship with a dealer would have to allege and prove that the lessee was
not in substantial compliance with the terms of the agreement. In so
holding, the supreme court in effect adopted the legislative judgment
reflected in the Franchise Practices Act that all oil company lessees
are in need of protection from arbitrary terminations or nonrenewals
by their lessors. Nevertheless, by declaring the newly enacted Franchise Practices statute to be merely an expression of the preexisting
public policy of the state, the court was free to apply it without
running afoul of the constitutional interdiction against legislative
interference with contracts already in existence."'
102. See U.C.C. § 1-203.
103. See id. § 2-103(1)(b).
104. See id. § 1-203.
105. See Gellhorn, supra note 54, at 495-505.
106. See U.C.C. § 2-309 & Comment 8.
107. Modification by agreement needs no consideration to be binding. See id.
§ 2-209(1)..
108. See note 92 supra.
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In concluding that service station operators needed protection
against lease terminations, the New Jersey Supreme Court relied on
two earlier decisions, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.'" and
Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson,110 in which it had declared that
enforcement of grossly unfair contractual terms between parties of
grossly unequal bargaining strength would violate the public policy
of New Jersey. But in relying on Henningsen and Ellsworth Dobbs,
the court in Marinello overlooked important factual distinctions between the plaintiffs in the earlier cases and the position of service
station operators. The earlier decisions brought the judicial power to
bear on behalf of a consumer faced with nearly incomprehensible
"legalese" drafted by professionals and buried in fine print. In both
cases, the consumer was relieved of his obligation to read and understand the fine print terms, in part because even had he understood
the clauses in question, he had no realistic opportunity to bargain to
exclude them.
Marinello, on the other hand, was an experienced Shell dealer
who was well aware of the terms of his lease. He took the initiative
to arrange a meeting to complain about the rent provisions, and, at
that meeting, the term of the lease was increased from one year to
three years. The only hint of any lack of assent is that Shell, the
property owner, insisted that it would lease its station and license its
trademark only on its own terms,' although it was prepared to discuss those terms with the lessee. Shell's ability to control the terms
of the deal flowed naturally from its superior bargaining position as
a property owner dealing with a prospective tenant. The official comments to section 2-302 of the Code make clear the drafters' intent to
leave undisturbed the allocation of risks resulting solely from the
superior bargaining power of one party, absent evidence of oppression
or unfair surprise.1 2 There is no evidence of either in Marinello.
Whereas the car buyer in Henningsen and the seller of real property
in Ellsworth Dobbs had no other way to obtain the goods or services
they needed, Marinello had, before investing thirteen years in his
station, many other options that would have enabled him to avoid
being placed in so vulnerable a position. Moreover, in contrast to the
situation in Henningsen, Marinello entered into his relationship with
Shell by choice, with his eyes open, judging that the deal as offered
109. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
110. 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967) (invalidating a clause in a contract between
a home owner and a real estate broker that obligated the owner to pay a commission
if the broker found a buyer, even if the sale was never completed).
111. The change in the term of Marinello's lease was apparently the result of a
change in Shell's policy rather than any persuasion by Marinello. See 120 N.J. Super.
at 365, 294 A.2d at 257.
112. See U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1.
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would be advantageous to him. To be sure, the deal, as the trial court
found and the Code recognizes, has to be viewed in its totality and is
more than the papers actually signed. Thus, the trial court found that
both parties assumed that their relationship would continue unless
Marinello gave Shell cause to replace him. But it seems fair to say
that Marinello assumed the risk that Shell's good cause might simply
be a conviction that another dealer could do a better job.
Notwithstanding the shared expectations of the contracting parties in this regard, the New Jersey Supreme Court, by its decision,
reversed the relation of the parties to each other. According to the
agreement they had made, Shell could decide whether to extend Marinello's dealership. According to the supreme court's decision, so long
as Marinello was in substantial compliance with the lease, only he
could decide to end the relationship."' Thus, even a good faith decision to operate the station directly would expose Shell to potential
liability for breach of contract.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey relied on the concept of unconscionability and its power to redraft contracts to reverse the positions of landlord and tenant, giving the tenant a perpetual lease, so
long as he substantially complied with his agreement. But, in its
attempt to prevent oppression of service station dealers, the New
Jersey Supreme Court may itself have created unfair surprise in the
contract terms as applied to the oil company. Had Shell realized at
the outset that, in entering into an agreement with Marinello, it
would lose any right to lease its station to another franchisee or even
to take possession and operate it directly, it might well have thought
again about how to distribute its gasoline. The same criticism cannot
be leveled at the legislature's action in passing the Franchise Practices Act: the prospective effect of the statute at least gives the oil
companies fair warning and thus permits more careful screening of
prospective lessees, as well as more explicit provisions in the lease
setting out the essential terms of the relationship.
The Marinello holding was asserted in Ashland Oil, Inc. v.
Donahue ' by a service station operator facing a much more acute
problem, termination on ten days' notice. According to the facts set
out in the opinion by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals,
Donahue challenged the oil company's right to terminate his dealership on ten days' notice, despite a provision in the lease permitting
such action. His contention that an implied good cause limitation on
termination was part of the agreement closely tracked Marinello's
argument. But Donahue went one step further and asserted that the
113. See 63 N.J. at 411, 307 A.2d at 603.
114. 223 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1976).
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termination provision should be declared void as against public policy."' The trial court granted Ashland's motion to strike the defenses,
granted immediate possession to Ashland, and, on its own motion,
certified the question of the legal sufficiency of Donahue's defenses
to the supreme court of appeals." 6
Thus, a pure question of law was presented: one party wanted
its written lease agreement enforced; the other argued that such enforcement would be unconscionable. Although the dealership agreement set out some standards relating to quality control and destruction of good will, it expressly provided that the oil company determine whether to terminate, and the separate lease agreement gave
both parties an absolute right of cancellation on ten days' notice. The
oil company asserted that it had given the requisite notice and should
have been entitled to recover its property.
The supreme court of appeals rejected Ashland's claim that this
was purely a question of property law. Instead, recognizing that the
lease and the dealer agreement were inseparable, it construed them
as forming an integrated business relationship. "7 Since this relationship involved a "transaction in goods,"' article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code was directly applicable. Turning to Donahue's
unconscionability argument, the court decided that the termination
provision of the dealer contract was unconscionable on its face. The
termination clauses in the lease and the corresponding supply contract did not coincide. Although either party could terminate the
lease in the middle of a term, only Ashland could terminate the
dealer contract in the middle of a term. The court hypothesized a
situation where the dealer might be forced to buy gasoline after termination of his lease, since he could not terminate his supply contract, and then found this result to be so harsh as to make the two
documents, taken together, unconscionable as written.'
The court remanded the case for the taking of evidence and
consideration of Donahue's defenses in order to permit the court to
decide what to do about the unconscionable term, that is, whether
to excise it from the agreement or limit it so as to avoid an unconscionable result.2" In response to Ashland's objections to the consideration of parol evidence, the court pointed out that since the agreements were unconscionable as written, they were ambiguous enough
to make parol evidence admissible. The lower court was directed to
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

See id. at 437.
See id. at 435.
See id. at 437-38.
U.C.C. § 2-102.
See 223 S.E.2d at 438, 440.
See id. at 440-41.
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take evidence to determine the commercial setting, purpose, and
effect of the transaction, and any other evidence on course of dealing,
performance, and usage of trade that may have been part
course
of this of
long-standing relationship.' 2
'
The West Virginia court pointedly did not base its decision on a
mere assessment of inequality of bargaining power.'" No defect in the
bargaining process was even claimed by Donahue, except that the
lease he signed was "grossly unfair." One basis for the claim of unfairness was that the lease allegedly did not reflect the understanding of
the parties-that it was incomplete. The Code's parol evidence rule",
is designed to deal with such claims, making evidence of commercial
understandings as part of the agreement admissible to explain or
supplement even an integrated written document.' 4 No finding of
ambiguity is a prerequisite. ' The Code very clearly gives less weight
to the writing than did the common law courts and affords litigants
a much greater opportunity to be sure that their legitimate expectations are before the trier of fact. Hence, no ambiguity need be manufactured by calling a written term unconscionable. If the real complaint is that the writing is an inaccurate memorial of the agreement,
courts are empowered to weigh that claim on its merits without resorting to an unconscionability rationale.
In sum, once the court decided that the situation with which it
was dealing was covered by article 2, a conclusion that seems eminently defensible, the Code's liberal parol evidence rule would have
provided a perfectly straightforward means for considering Donahue's claims. The court's effort to demonstrate the facial unconscionability of the termination clause rings false in what is otherwise an
excellent opinion. Ashland was not attempting to force Donahue to
remain in business against his will by holding him to half of his
agreement. Thus, any injustice the court perceived was clearly hypothetical.'26 In general, the judicial process works best when confined
121. See id. at 440.
122. [W]e do not find it necessary to base our holding upon a disparity in bargaining power between Ashland and Donahue. In most commercial
transactions it may be assumed that there is some inequality of bargaining
power, and this Court cannot undertake to write a special rule of such general
application as to remove bargaining advantages or disadvantages in the
commercial area, nor do we think it necessary that we undertake to do so.

Id.
123. U.C.C. § 2-202.
124. See id. § 2-202(a) & Comment 2.
125. See id. § 2-202, Comment 1(c).
126. The court's supposition also overlooks the fact that, despite provisions setting out certain limits on what Donahue could or had to buy, the contract between
Ashland and Donahue was essentially a requirements contract, regulated by section
2-306 of the Code. So long as Donahue had acted in good faith in closing his business,
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to the concrete situation that occasioned the complaint. It seems
unnecessary and unwise to speculate about all possible contingencies.
Moreover, and more serious, the court fell into a trap that the Code
specifically seeks to sidestep: defining unconscionability from the
ivory tower. By holding the clause unconscionable on its face, the
court made its determination without the benefit of the justification,
if any, that the drafting party has the right to offer. 1
This case amply illustrates the danger of reading a contract out
of context.12 ' Although the hypothetical envisioned by the court appears, harsh and heavy-handed when considered in the abstract, the
terms contained in the dealer contract can be explained in a commercial context as an innocent attempt by the oil company to work
within federal allocation regulations.12 ' To preserve the competitive
structure existing in the petroleum industry at the time of the
"energy crisis" and to ensure an equitable sharing of shortages so that
independent marketers would not be squeezed out of business, federal
regulations require suppliers to continue to supply those who were
their customers during the statutory base period.12 ' The regulatory
scheme focuses on the dealer, allocating a share of available supply
to the marketer,' and not to the marketing location. Moreover, although "going out of business" ends a marketer's right to an allocation,"' the regulations clearly provide that if a marketer relocates
within a reasonable time and serves substantially the same customers
or market as formerly, he has not "gone out of business" and is
entitled to demand that his supplier continue to sell him gasoline.12 '
Hence, it makes perfect sense from the oil company's perspective to
keep a dealer's supply contract in effect, even after his lease has been
the Code would have absolved him from liability to Ashland. See id. § 2-306, Comment
2.
127. U.C.C. § 2-302(2) provides, "When it is claimed or appears to the court that
the contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded
a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and
effect." (emphasis added).
128. Ashland apparently wished to confine the court's inquiry to the simple
question of right to possession of the property. In Wisconsin, such a strategy proved
successful, for any claim arising out of such collateral arrangements as franchising
agreements was held to be severable from the issue of right to possession and more
properly treated in separate nonsummary proceedings. See Rossow Oil Co. v. Heiman,
72 Wis. 2d 696, 704-05, 242 N.W.2d 176, 181-82 (1976). Given the developments in the
law of unconscionability outlined in this Article, the wisest strategy would apparently
be to attempt this procedural short-circuit, and also to advance any valid justification
for the challenged clause, so as to shorten the litigation.
129. See 10 C.F.R. § 211 (1977).
130. See id. § 211.9(a)(1).
131. See id. § 211.11(a).
132. Id. § 211.11(c).
133. See id. § 211.106(c)(1).
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terminated in order to define the terms on which the dealer will be
supplied if he reestablishes his business at a nearby location. The
discrepancy between the two termination clauses, then, can be commercially justified and should not by itself have rendered the agreement unconscionable and unenforceable.'34
Nonetheless, having determined that the written agreement was
unconscionable, the court indicated that the task of the legal system
was to ensure that the relationship between the parties was consistent
with the obligation of good faith imposed on both by law. It is clear
from the court's opinion that it was not prepared to hold Donahue to
the naked terms of the original lease agreement. At the same time,
however, it was not about to lock the dealer and the oil company into
an arrangement terminable only by the lessee. Instead, it insisted
that the agreement should reflect commercial reality, both in general
and as between the two parties. Thus, unlike the New Jersey court,
the West Virginia court made no attempt to impose its own standard
as to what would constitute grounds for termination on parties whose
assumptions about control over the duration of their relationship
might have been very different from the court's. Rather, enforceable
rights and duties would be tailor-made to take account of the peculiar
needs and reasonable expectations of these parties.
The West Virginia court's heavy emphasis on enforcing the
agreement makes Donahue a much less radical decision than
Marinello, and the decision seems to strike a better balance between
the legitimate concerns of the gas station operator and the oil company. To be sure, the court did review a decision the oil company
134. This finding would not have put an end to judicial scrutiny of the agree-

ment, however. Particularly in this case, where Ashland's own documents set out the
grounds for abrupt terminations, see 223 S.E.2d at 436, and hence invited review, a
good cause requirement was ready-made and supplied by Ashland itself.
Curiously, neither the court nor defendant's counsel mentioned U.C.C. § 2-309

(3), which applies specifically to terminations and is clearly aimed at-merchant-tomerchant transactions. This oversight is particularly puzzling since the section is one

of very few in the Code that refers to unconscionability and provides a specific example: "[A]n agreement dispensing with reasonable notification [of termination] is
invalid if its operation would be unconscionable." Id. Unlike the more general section, which is concerned with unfairness at the time of contracting, section 2-309(3)
requires an assessment of whether operation of the clause will produce an unacceptable result. If Donahue's complaint was, at least in part, the short notice, the West
Virginia court overlooked another statutory peg on which to hang its unconscionability
decision.
Of course, the omission of reference to section 2-309(3) may have been deliberate,
since Donahue hoped to achieve much more than longer notice. Donahue sought to
challenge the arbitrary nature of Ashland's reserved right to terminate, not merely the
ten-day notice provision; he sought reformation of the agreement to include a good
cause requirement for termination. Under those circumstances, he may have chosen
to focus his attack on the lack of standards for decisionmaking, rather than on the
much narrower issue of notice.
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would have preferred to keep internal and hence inexpensive. On the
other hand, the decision simply recognizes that fairness to all litigants, large or small, with or without bargaining clout, demands that
agreements affecting important legal rights be considered in their
entirety and not as artificially circumscribed by the party drafting
the form.
The opinions of both the New Jersey trial court and the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recognized that the writing is only
part of a commercial agreement. Viewed as a simple parol evidence
question and given the specific facts of these cases, expanding the
contract to include a good cause qualification of the lessor's reserved
power to control his property may have been justified.' But neither
court expressly addressed the issue of whether, in commercial reality,
the owner of a trademark might be unwilling to license others to use
it unless he could terminate the license quickly and easily. To permit
the lessee-dealer to claim a dispute resolution mechanism that goes
far beyond the parties' shared expectations could skew the relationship to the disadvantage of the oil company.
Even before the Marinello decision, franchisors were required to
walk a fine line between exercising too much control over their franchisees, thus exposing themselves to antitrust liability,13 and exercising too little control, thus risking loss of all rights to their trademark
by abandonment. 7 If the law, whether legislative or judge-made,
now begins redrafting agreements that were carefully designed to
balance on that line, more attention should be given to whether the
dilemma for franchisors will become intolerable.
The dilemma arises because of the conflicting policies underlying
the antitrust and trademark laws. The antitrust laws are designed to
ensure free competition. Too much control over the operation of independent marketing units undermines this goal and, accordingly, exposes the franchisor to the threat of both criminal penalties and civil
damages.' 135. Not every court hearing that argument, even from a gasoline service station
operator, has been persuaded. The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed a long course of
dealing governed entirely by short-term leases and concluded that the dealer had no
legitimate expectation that he was entitled to a renewal of his lease. See William C.
Cornitius, Inc. v. Wheeler, 276 Or. 747, 556 P.2d 666 (1976). In a case involving termination of an alcoholic beverage distributorship, the Ninth Circuit reversed a lower
court finding of an implied good cause requirement for termination as "clearly erroneous." See Alpha Distrib. Co. v. Jack Daniel Distillery, 454 F.2d 442, 448 (9th Cir.
1972).
136. See generally McCarthy, Trademark Franchisingand Antitrust: The Trouble with Tie.ins, 58 CALF. L. Rav. 1085 (1970).
137. See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959);
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976).

138. A hotly debated question is what effect antitrust violations should have on
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By contrast, in the area of franchising, the law of trademarks
pulls in the opposite direction. A trademark is valuable property,
protected by federal'39 and state " ' laws against infringement by those
who seek to profit by using another's goodwill. But since this protection is given in part to protect the public, which associates the trademark with some uniform level of quality,"' quality control must be
part of the trademark owner's responsibility. If no quality standards
exist, or if they exist only on paper, the trademark loses all meaning
and is deemed to be abandoned,"' thus making it available for use
by others. Hence, if he wishes to retain his trademark rights, the
trademark holder must set and enforce quality standards. "3 Since
essentially franchising is allowing others to use a trademark, every
franchisor must be permitted some control over his franchisees in
order to ensure consistent quality and the economic success of the
entire franchise system.''
the ability to enforce contractual rights. Some courts have denied enforcement when
the contract right is being used to effectuate anticompetitive practices. See, e.g.,
Milsen Co. v. Southland Corp., 454 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1971); Semmes Motors v. Ford
Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197 (2d Cir. 1970). Other courts have stressed that the treble
damage remedy, not a defense of illegality, is intended to be the exclusive means of
enforcement of the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516 (1959);
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rubenfeld, 48 App. Div. 2d 428, 370 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1975), aff'd
mem., 40 N.Y.2d 936, 358 N.E.2d 882, 390 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1976).
139. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976).
140. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 333.01-.52 (1976), as amended by Act of Mar. 28,
1978, ch. 698, 1978 Minn. Laws 602. See generally J. McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITON (1973).

141. The purpose underlying any trade-mark statute is twofold. One
is to protect the public so it may be confident that ... it will get the product
which it asks for and wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a trade-mark
has spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the product,
he is protected in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates and
cheats.
S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprintedin [1946] U.S. CODE CONG. Sv.
1274.
142. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976); J. McCARTHY, supra note 140, § 18:15.
143. See, e.g., Robinson Co. v. Plastics Research & Dev. Corp., 264 F. Supp. 852
(W.D. Ark. 1967); Midwest Fur Producers Ass'n v. Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n, 127
F. Supp. 217 (W.D. Wis. 1955).
144. In a case involving another Shell dealer, Frank Marinello's brother, a federal
district court found impermissible conflict between federal registration and regulation
of trademarks and the state court's imposition of a good cause limitation on the
trademark owner's ability "to grant a license of that mark for a specific, definite term."
Mariniello v. Shell Oil Co., 368 F. Supp. 1401, 1405-07 (D.N.J. 1974), rev'd., 511 F.2d
853 (3d Cir. 1975). On appeal, however, the Third Circuit reversed the decision, finding
that state and federal law could coexist harmoniously. The court reasoned that Congress had not expressly intended to preempt the entire field of trademark law and that
there was no incongruity between the state law announced in Marinello v. Shell Oil
Co., 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974), and the
purposes of the federal law. See Mariniello v. Shell Oil Co., 511 F.2d 853, 857-59 (3d
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There are other legitimate reasons, inherent in the structure of
a franchised operation, for a franchisor to reserve termination rights.
As Richard Epstein has pointed out, a substandard franchisee can
hurt the goodwill of the entire system.'45 Since all outlets are perceived to be alike, an unpleasant experience at one station may cause
consumers to avoid the entire chain. Therefore, both the franchisor
and other franchisees will be hurt if the system cannot quickly purge
those who destroy the trademark's drawing power. A simple
"terminable on adequate notice" clause, then, may serve the interests both of those franchisees who do meet the standards and of the
franchisor. Such net gain to the system may outweigh the risk of a
mistaken judgment to terminate and may actually serve every franchisee's self-interest by ensuring maximum quality control at minimum cost.
In short, one need not impute sinister motives to a lessorfranchisor to explain the absence of a good cause standard in the
written agreements. If the lessor who includes such a provision must
document and prove the correctness of his determination every time
he exercises his power to terminate or to fail to renew a lease, any
such exercise, no matter how justified, becomes potential grounds for
litigation.' Even clear cases must be carefully documented to survive possible court challenge, adding to the expense of monitoring
lessee compliance. Moreover, the possibility that a factfinder may
find even valid reasons unpersuasive makes any termination more
difficult. "' In sum, since adding a good cause requirement would
Cir. 1975). The logic of this holding suggests that any conduct of the franchisee that
requires action by the franchisor to protect his trademark under federal law must also
constitute good cause to terminate under state law; otherwise, the two bodies of law
would pull in opposite directions, a result forbidden by the supremacy clause. See U.S.
CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
145. See Epstein, Unconscionability:A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & EcoN.
293, 314-15 (1975). The problem is compounded in the service station context, where
customers do not distinguish between the oil company's products and the service given
by the particular dealer over which the company has little control. Of 1234 customer
complaints received by The Gulf Oil Companies' southeastern office in the six months
ending June 30, 1977, 1054 referred to the service side of the operation, which is the
dealer's responsibility. In the customer's mind, the dealer and his supplier are identical. Parks Interview, supra note 47.
146. The problem is graphically illustrated by Amerada Hess Corp. v. Quinn, 143
N.J. Super. 237, 362 A.2d 1258 (Law. Div. 1976). In that case, the dealer was overcharging, a violation of both federal price controls and his lease. Despite a clear
showing of injury, the franchisor-oil company was enjoined from terminating its relationship with Quinn from December 19, 1974, until the court vacated the injunction
on May 7, 1976.
147. Shell representatives claimed that Marinello had not met their standards
for cleanliness and that the volume of his gasoline sales was inadequate. The trial court
found against Shell on both counts. See Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 120 N.J. Super.
357, 380-85, 294 A.2d 253, 265-68 (Law Div. 1972), modified, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598
(1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974).
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compel the franchisor to submit his reasons for termination or nonrenewal to impartial review, it increases the risks of entrusting his
trademark to a franchisee. Viewed in this light, the termination provisions typically contained in dealer contracts may not appear oppressive after all.
From the franchisee's point of view, weakening the franchisor's
power to protect the system against substandard operators may have
greater consequences than the loss of customers. The fear frequently
expressed is that if franchised distribution becomes too costly or requires too much loss of control over valuable system-wide goodwill,
franchisors will simply "integrate forward" and operate retail outlets
directly."' Indeed, in gasoline marketing this possibility is becoming
a reality. Tenneco Oil Company, for example, has already converted
virtually all its dealer outlets in the southeastern section of the
United States to company-owned operations."' In addition, BP Oil
Corporation is attempting to replace its dealer network with highvolume stations owned and controlled by the company.'" Further
evidence of forward integration is provided by a pending antitrust
suit in which independent dealers have charged their supplier with
attempting to monopolize the market for its brand of gasoline by
underpricing them at company-owned outlets. 5 '
Paradoxically, then, franchisees who want to be made secure
against termination may find that the demand for this security
means the end of the system within which they operate. Reacting to
this very real possibility, dealers and their political allies are pressing
for legislation to prohibit oil companies from engaging in retail operations and to require them to divest themselves of station properties.
In Maryland, such a "divorcement" law is in effect and has survived
a major constitutional challenge mounted by the oil companies.' 2
Forward integration is also challenged by provisions of the newly
enacted Federal Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, which declares
that a decision to replace a franchised operation with an employeerun station is not good cause to terminate or fail to renew a franchise.' Unless oil company integration of retail functions is universally prohibited, however, dissatisfied dealers will continue to seek
148. See Standard Oil Co. (California) v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 320-21
(1949) (Douglas, J., separate opinion).
149. Moon Interview, supra note 50.
150. See Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 367 (D. Md. 1975).
151. Castoe v. Amerada Hess Corp., [1976] 2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
61,054
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
152. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 98 S. Ct. 2207 (1978) (upholding MD.
ANN. CODE art. 56, § 157E (1976 Cum. Supp.)).
153. See Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-297, §§
102(b)(2)(E)(ii), (b)(3)(D)(ii), 92 Stat. 322 (1978); note 206 infra. See also The Oil
Majors Retreat from the Gasoline Pump, Bus. WEFK, Aug. 7, 1978, at 50.
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judicial protection from the situation in which they find themselves
when their leases are not renewed or are cancelled.
Both the Marinello' and Donahue'55 courts responded favorably
to dealer complaints, but the decisions represent widely differing
judicial attitudes toward an on-going problem whose resolution has
important economic and political implications. The Donahue court's
emphasis on protecting the reasonable expectations of a lessee seems
a legitimate exercise of the judicial power to facilitate private lawmaking. By contrast, the effect of the Marinello court's decision was
far more drastic, for in protecting the interests of the lessee, the court
effectively destroyed the rights of a property owner who had offered
his property on limited terms only, which terms were apparently
attractive enough to the lessee to induce agreement to them.
As it has become evident that gasoline and other petroleum products are vital and limited resources, oil companies have been subjected to increased public scrutiny and regulation. That government
can regulate private rights in the public interest is beyond question;
what is subject to question, however, is whether the court system,
designed for dispute resolution, should undertake a complete restructuring of commercial relationships freely entered into and bargained
for in good faith. If the effect of an unconscionability decision is to
lock the parties into a lifelong relationship quite contrary to original
expectations, then a strong argument can be made that in attempting
to prevent oppression and unfair surprise, the law has itself become
oppressive.
IV. FINE PRINT TERMS IN THE SERVICE STATION
CONTEXT
Although both Marinello and Donahue claimed that they understood their leaseholds to be perpetual unless they gave their lessors
cause to terminate the relationship, surely they understood at the
time they signed their agreements that control over the duration of
the relationship was reserved by the lessor. Even if the term in question may have been misunderstood, it was certainly no surprise to
either of them that the oil company asserted the right to reclaim its
property. By contrast, service station operators in two other cases
asserted that, at the time of contracting, they did not understand a
crucial fine-print contractual term because they had not read the
forms. They sought excuse from their agreements because of unfair
surprise.
This problem was dramatically presented in Weaver v. American
154. Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 920 (1974).
155. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Donahue, 223 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1976).
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Oil Co. "IIn 1956, Howard Weaver entered into a lease with an American Oil Company representative without reading it, making any attempt to read it, or asking any questions about it. Each succeeding
year, the ritual of "blind" lease-signing was repeated. As part of the
fine print, American Oil Company had included an exculpatory/indemnity clause, providing that the oil company would be free
from liability for any injuries caused by the oil company's own negligence. In addition, the lessee was to indemnify the oil company for
all claims or actions that might arise.
While operating under this lease, Weaver and one of his employees were injured when an oil company employee, in the course of
repairs, negligently sprayed them with gasoline, which in turn ignited. Both Weaver and his assistant filed suit against the oil company and the negligent employee.
Here, posed in the starkest terms, was the dilemma: should
Weaver, a man with nine years of formal education and limited business experience, whose profits from the station amounted to only
$5,000 to $6,000 per year, absorb his own and his assistant's losses
because of a clause he neither saw nor understood?
In deciding this issue, the trial court employed a conventional
form of contract analysis. Because it is impossible to know the subjective state of mind of a party at the time he enters into an agreement,
courts have traditionally used a reasonable person standard to ascertain whether the contracting parties possessed the requisite intent to
be bound. Since no reasonable person would sign a document having
legal consequences without understanding it, a party's signature on
a contract is presumed to be a manifestation of assent to the terms
contained therein. This presumption, in turn, has been distilled into
a duty to read, under which "one having the capacity to understand
a written document who reads [and signs] it, or, without reading it
or having it read to him, signs it, is bound by the signature.""' Applying this rule to the facts of the case before it, the trial court held
Weaver responsible for having understood the terms of the contract
he signed.'"
The approach adopted by the trial court is consistent with the
principle that the law need not protect one who is willing to risk
signing an agreement he does not fully understand, so long as the
156. 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971).
157. Rossi v. Douglas, 203 Md. 190, 199, 100 A.2d 3, 7 (1953).

158. This approach has been followed elsewhere. Ina decision rendered only
eight months earlier on very similar facts, the New York Court of Appeals rejected an
unconscionability argument, pointing out that the dealer was not obliged to enter into
the transaction and hence was bound by his assent. See Levine v. Shell Oil Co., 28
N.Y.2d 205, 213, 269 N.E.2d 799, 803, 321 N.Y.S.2d 81, 86-87 (1971).
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other party to the contract neither actively misleads him nor prevents
him from seeking independent advice. Parties are thus entirely free
to decide how much time, effort, and money to invest in exploring the
possible consequences of their contractual obligations. To encourage
private vigilance in contract negotiation"' and to safeguard the integrity of written documents generally, the law treats a party's signature
as evidence of binding assent to all written terms.
When Weaver's lease was negotiated, he had to decide whether
he wanted to be an American Oil dealer on the terms offered. Presumably in making this decision he consciously attempted to judge
whether he would make a profit, given the contract terms. The possibility that he might be mistaken and lose his investment should have
been clear. Having decided to sign the lease, Weaver was bound to
its terms. And since freedom to make advantageous contracts must
carry with it the obligation to carry out losing ones as well, Weaver
could not expect the state or the courts to intervene on his behalf if
the bargain proved unprofitable.
As Professor Leff has noted, however, the situation becomes
more complicated when "failure of self-protection . . . might have
serious and irreversible consequences."" 0 For example, when death or
personal injury might be uncompensated as a result of an improvident bargain, government is more likely to intervene. Howard Weaver
was thinking about the possibility of a profit, not a calamitous accident, when he entered into his relationship with American. It may be
that incentives and self-interest can be relied upon to produce a
contract that is fair to both parties only so long as the contract concerns risks of which both parties are aware. Thus, when life or health
is affected in ways that a contracting party may never have considered, the impetus for government to intervene grows stronger."'
At least with respect to his own injuries, Weaver's plight presented a particularly strong case. First, the financial burden of a
serious injury was facing a person who had not been aware that he
had to bear that burden; second, that injury was caused by the party
claiming exculpation and indemnity. Courts traditionally have been
angered by attempts to avoid liability for one's own negligence, which
is seen as encouraging carelessness and irresponsibility."' On appeal,
given the facts of this case, neither the intermediate appellate court
159. Duncan Kennedy has characterized this stance as the "individualist" mode.
See Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 HARv.L. REv. 1685
(1976). He points to the assumption that rules, rather than case-by-case standards, will
alert potential victims to danger. See id. at 1696.
160. Leff, supra note 4, at 353 n.19.
161. The same point is made in Note, The Significance of ComparativeBargaining Power in the Law of Exculpation, 37 CoLUM. L. Rsv. 248, 268 (1937).
162. See Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 321, 327 (1973).
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nor the Indiana Supreme Court was prepared to apply to duty-toread rule to Weaver. Instead, given the harshness of the terms sought
to be enforced, the appellate courts contended that a duty to disclose
should be imposed un the party claiming the benefit of the type of
clause in question."'
The two courts parted company, however, with respect to the
weight each would accord Weaver's imputed understanding of the
agreement, as gleaned from the commercial context in which he operated. In determining whether Weaver was subjected to unfair surprise
with respect to the provisions contained in the lease agreement, the
intermediate appellate court distinguished between the exculpatory
clause, which allocated to the operator the risk of the oil company's
negligence affecting him, and the indemnity clause, which obliged
the operator to take the risk of oil company negligence affecting third
parties. " 4 In the view of that court, the indemnity clause imposed
no unusual burden on Weaver because standard liability insurance
policies, widely available and generally carried by dealers in Weaver's
position, offer protection against third party claims. As long as the
indemnifying dealer carries appropriate liability insurance, damages
suffered by third parties because of the negligence of either the dealer
or the oil company are paid by the dealer's insurance carrier. Thus,
regardless of whether Weaver ever saw the indemnity clause, general
commercial practice cushioned him against the risks imposed under
the clause and made those risks manageable and not unfair.
The intermediate court's analysis also suggests another basis for
finding that the indemnity clause did not constitute unfair surprise.
The widespread use of liability insurance by dealers in Weaver's position indicates a general understanding within the business community of how the risks of handling volatile and dangerous substances, such as gasoline, are to be shared. As a businessman, then,
regardless of whether he had actually read the specific clause in question, Weaver should have expected that his agreement with American
conformed to commercially accepted business practices. 6' Thus, the
163. "The party seeking to enforce such a contract has the burden of showing
that the provisions were explained to the other party and came to his knowledge and
there was in fact a real and voluntary meeting of the minds and not merely an objective
meeting." 257 Ind. at 462, 276 N.E.2d at 148 (emphasis in original).
164. See Weaver v. American Oil Co., 261 N.E.2d 99, modified on rehearing,262
N.E.2d 663 (Ind. App. 1970), superseded, 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971).
165. In addition to the generally imposed duty to read, other considerations bear
upon contracts between professionals in any trade or business, those whom the Code
calls "merchants." See U.C.C. § 2-104(1). They must act not only as reasonable men,
but also as reasonable merchants. Imputed to them is knowledge of the customs and
practices that are the unwritten elements of their trade or business. See id. § 2-104,
Comment 2. The Code fixes the reasonable merchant standard in two different ways.

1978]

UNCONSCIONABILITY

indemnity arrangement should have come as no surprise.
As for the exculpatory clause, the court found gross unfairness
in permitting American to shift, by draftsmanship alone, the risk for
Weaver's own injuries, which would not be covered by standard liability insurance. Reasoning by analogy from section 2-302,1"' the intermediate court looked at the economic disparity between Weaver
and American, at Weaver's lack of education, and at the complexity
of the form he signed. Once it had determined that the exculpatory
clause represented the shift of an unusual and considerable burden,
which Weaver had no reason to expect, the court refused to enforce
the clause unless American could show that Weaver was aware of and
understood its implications." '
The Supreme Court of Indiana approved this reasoning, but
went one step further, finding no distinction between the exculpatory
and indemnity portions of the clause." 8 The majority found something fundamentally unfair about a bargaining process in the course
of which the dominant party had drawn up a form designed to give
itself maximum protection and then had not even explained to the
other, weaker party the risks that party was to assume. What the
supreme court found particularly unfair was that Weaver had unwittingly manifested assent to enormous potential liability in exchange
for relatively meager profits.'6 ' Hence, not only were the consequences
serious and of social as well as personal concern, but the court found
that Weaver had not properly understood his risks and might not
have agreed to the transaction if he had. Based on an assessment of
Weaver's education and experience, it rejected the argument that, as
a gasoline dealer, Weaver ought to have understood the ramifications
of the type of commercial agreement he had signed even if he had not
read the contract itself. Further, the court saw no reason to distinguish between those risks that Weaver did not in fact bear alone,
because of the use of insurance in the industry, and those that he
did. Serving notice that henceforth it would insist that both parties
It provides generally that merchants are bound by customs and usages of their trade
of which they "are or should be aware." Id. § 1-205(3) (emphasis added). In addition,

certain very specific usages of trade are incorporated into the Code itself to govern
transactions between merchants. See, e.g., id. §§ 2-201(2), -207(2) (imposing special
duties to read in transactions between merchants).
166. In Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Donahue, 223 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1976), the court
determined that gasoline marketing by lease and sales agreement constituted a transaction in goods within the scope of article 2 of the Code, thus making section 2-302
directly applicable.

167. See Weaver v. American Oil Co., 261 N.E.2d 99, modified on rehearing,262

N.E.2d 663 (Ind. App. 1970), superseded, 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971).
168. See 257 Ind. at 460, 276 N.E.2d at 145.
169. See id. at 465, 276 N.E.2d at 148.
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be aware, before signing a contract, of the full import of the type of
exculpatory clause contained in Weaver's lease, the court denied
American the benefit of a conclusive presumption of assent. Instead,
it placed the burden of proving actual, subjective, informed assent on
the party seeking enforcement of the clause. Since American had not
met that burden, the court directed that judgment be entered for
Weaver, relieving him of all liability under his lease.
As important as what the Indiana Supreme Court decided in
Weaver may be what it explicitly declined to decide. The court went
to some lengths to stress that its decision was not intended to preclude the individual participants in a commercial venture, each of
which derives profit, from deciding among themselves which link in
the distributive chain can best or most cheaply be responsible for the
costs of injury in order to make the entire enterprise more profitable.
An insurer, for example, might well be willing to give a more favorable rate to the service station operator, who exercises day-to-day
control and can better take precautions to prevent accidents, than to
the more remote, though deeper-pocketed, supplier. Hence, the cost
of insuring the supplier might be greater than the sum of all the
operators' individual insurance premiums. Because such cost allocation is a legitimate and vital part of business planning, the supreme
court refused to invalidate clauses such as that employed in Weaver
on a per se basis.1 0 Instead, pointing out that insurance contracts are
specifically designed for just such purposes, the court stressed that
its concern in Weaver centered on the fact that the dealer was not
7
made aware of the risk that he was assuming.1 1
In Weaver, the problem of serious personal injury caused by the
negligence of the very party that had arranged for self-exculpation
made the case too difficult for courts to ignore. But, as has often been
remarked, hard cases make bad'law 7 2 The subsequent decision of a
federal district court in a Michigan case, Johnson v. Mobil Oil Co.,'
illustrates the absurd results that may occur when judges are too
quick to protect a party against what they perceive to be unfair surprise.
The contractual term at issue in Johnson was a clause precluding
recovery by a dealer of consequential damages caused by his supplier's breach. The clause was called into question when commercial
170. See id. An identical clause was upheld as compatible with public policy in
Loper v. Standard Oil Co., 138 Ind. App. 84, 211 N.E.2d 797 (1965).
171. See 257 Ind. at 465, 276 N.E.2d at 148.
172. See, e.g., Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
173. 415 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
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loss to the dealer's property followed an explosion and fire allegedly
caused by the delivery of gasoline containing water. In response to the
dealer's suit, Mobil moved for partial summary judgment, arguing
that since consequential damages were barred by the lease agreement, its liability, if any, was limited to the difference in value between the goods as warranted and the goods as delivered."'
Mobil doubtless considered that it had a very strong case. The
clause in question is specifically sanctioned by the Code as not prima
facie unconscionable, since only commercial loss, not personal injuries, had occurred.' 5 Furthermore, although the plaintiff had difficulty reading, he was able to testify in an understandable manner,
thus rebutting any inference that Mobil's representative should have
realized that he was dealing with a person of reduced capacity. Under
questioning by both Mobil and the court, Johnson admitted that he
had not told Mobil that he was nearly illiterate, nor had he asked for
any information or explanation. Indeed, the court specifically agreed
with Mobil that "'[there is no basis . . . for a finding that any
Mobil representative was guilty of unfair or oppressive conduct,
fraud, overreaching, misrepresentation or sharp practice.' ,"76Nonetheless, the court denied the motion for partial summary judgment,
thus affording the plaintiff an opportunity to prove consequential
damages despite the clause.
Perhaps because Mobil thought the unconscionability argument
was so weak, no effort was apparently made to determine what Johnson understood about the agreement apart from the writing. If the
fine print, read or unread, coincided with Johnson's reasonable expectations, he would have had difficulty, under the Code, in arguing
either surprise or oppression. 7 Myopic attention to the written document without considering the surrounding circumstances ignores the
Code draftsmen's emphasis on the "bargain of the parties in fact."'7
As dealers themselves have argued in challenging the exercise by
suppliers of reserved termination rights, the written documents
should not be the end of the inquiry; other evidence, drawn from
commercial practices, is needed to ascertain the enforceable bar79
gain.
174. See id. at 266.
175. See U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
176. 415 F. Supp. at 269 (quoting defendant's supplemental brief).
177. See Murray, supra note 4, at 15.
178. See U.C.C. § 1-201(3).
179. See text accompanying notes 87-155 supra. By contrast, and not surprisingly, when dealers have sought to avoid exculpatory or loss-limiting clauses, they have
attempted to confine the court's attention to whether they had in fact been made aware
of the terms on the piece of paper. In sum, the dealers seek to refer to their more general
understanding when it is advantageous to do so, but to focus exclusively on the writing
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The Johnson case demonstrates the fallacy of looking only at the
writing. Johnson was himself a seller of goods, dealing in gasoline,
tires, batteries, and other automotive accessories. As such, he fell
within the Code's definition of a merchant' 8 and thus was chargeable
under the Code with knowledge of the practices involved in the transaction of his business. Indeed, in this instance, the Code's imputation
of knowledge makes good sense. It appears reasonable to assume that
even a semiliterate seller would agree with Justice Holmes that in
entering into bargains with buyers, he never intended to become a
guarantor against all the possible consequences of a breach of warranty or of a promise to deliver. 8 ' As a seller himself, then, Johnson
most likely understood Mobil's position fully whether or not he had
ever read the forms. Thus, he should not have been shocked by
Mobil's attempt to rely on the limitation of liability. In short, this
clause was hardly surprising.
Assuming arguendo that Johnson was surprised to find this standard seller protection clause, however, the question remains whether
the surprise was unfair. What seemed to disturb the federal district
court in this regard was the inequality of bargaining power between
the parties to the contract. As the court saw it, Mobil held "immense
bargaining power"' 2 vis-'a-vis a poorly educated layman and imposed
its terms on him with no real opportunity for him to question or even
understand them. The facts of the case, however, do not support this
characterization.
Johnson had been a successful Gulf dealer for three years when
Mobil's representative approached him to urge him to take on a
Mobil dealership. The record shows that the Mobil representative
returned more than once to try to persuade Johnson to join the Mobil
organization. If anything, it seems that Johnson's skill and initiative,
when that serves their purposes. Fairness and common sense are offended if the dealers
can have it both ways.
180. See U.C.C. § 2-104(1).
181. See Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 543-47 (1903)
(Holmes, J.); 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 236-37 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
Perhaps the duty to handle carefully a substance that is so obviously dangerous
fits better under the rubric of tort or strict liability, where breach of a duty of care
has traditionally carried with it responsibility for foreseeable consequences. In other
words, perhaps it is not so much a promise that was breached (to deliver 100% gasoline) but a duty imposed by law (to be careful to avoid explosions). As Professor
Gilmore has brilliantly demonstrated, however, perhaps in truth it no longer matters
which pigeonhole one chooses: "We may take the fact that damages in contract have
become indistinguishable from damages in tort as obscurely reflecting an instinctive,
almost unconscious realization that the two fields, which had been artifically set apart,
are gradually merging and becoming one." G. GILMoRE, THE DEATH OF CoNTRAcr 88
(1974).
182. 415 F. Supp. at 269.
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desired by Mobil, gave him the superior bargaining position, 1' which
he apparently used to set the only term about which he was directly
concerned: the rent. 8 ' Signing took place while Johnson was busy
operating his station, and it appears that he would not have wanted,
nor even tolerated, any lengthy explanations of all the fine print at
that time. Nonetheless, adopting the Weaver court's solution to the
question of commercial unconscionability, the court ruled that Johnson could not be bound by the form language unless Mobil could show
that it had obtained his "voluntary, knowing assent."'85
Because the case was a diversity action, the federal court applied
Michigan law, as the law of the place of contracting. In so doing, it
relied heavily on Allen v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.,'18 in which
the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed a grant of summary judgment against a would-be advertiser whose copy was negligently omitted from the Yellow Pages, holding that the telephone company's
contractual term limiting liability to refund of the agreed price was
unconscionable. The majority in Allen noted the advertiser's lack of
realistic alternatives for attempting to reach the same audience at
reasonable cost and the unwillingness of the telephone company to
offer space in its directory on any other terms. Because of the importance of the service to a subscriber and the company's monopoly
position, the contractual provision limiting liability for negligence
was seen as substantively unreasonable and void as against public
policy. The Allen case was therefore remanded for a trial on the
merits.
The Johnson court's heavy reliance on Allen appears ill-founded.
First, the Allen decision spawned a number of lawsuits in other
states, all of which rejected the Michigan court's finding of unconscionability.8 7 Second, even in Michigan the precedential value of
Allen is somewhat uncertain. Three years after the trial, the telephone company appealed an award of damages to Allen. The court
of appeals, which had previously denied a motion for rehearing, declined to reconsider the telephone company's position on the validit5
183. See generally FTC Industry Conference, supra note 30, at 561 (testimony
of W.W. Bryan, Humble Oil & Refining Co., indicating that competition for good
dealers is intense and it iscommon for good dealers to be enticed to take over a
competitor's station).
184. See 415 F. Supp. 268.
185. Id. at 269.
186. 18 Mich. App. 632, 171 N.W.2d 689 (1969), leave to appeal denied, 383
Mich. 804 (1970).
187. See University Hills Beauty Academy, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co., 554 P.2d 723 (Colo. App. 1976); Willie v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 219 Kan.
755, 549 P.2d 903 (1976); Gas House, Inc. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 289 N.C.
175, 221 S.E.2d 499 (1976). See generally Robinson Ins. & Real Estate, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 366 F. Supp. 307 (W.D. Ark. 1973).
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of the disputed language.'88 Despite its decision not to reconsider the
law of the case, the court's opinion cast substantial doubt on the
precedential value of the first holding. The judge writing for the court
indicated that he himself might have decided the issue in the previous appeal differently,"'8 and also pointedly noted that although the
Michigan Supreme Court had denied leave to appeal, that court had
taken pains to stress that its action was "'not to be taken as tacit or
other agreement with all the reasoning of the majority opinion
below.' "180 Moreover, in Allen, even though the clause was struck
down as unconscionable, the telephone company ultimately prevailed, since the court found that the plaintiff had failed to prove his
damages with requisite certainty.''
Although the Allen opinion has been criticized,8 2 it is no doubt
still entitled to some respect since it has never been expressly overruled. Nevertheless, the circumstances in Allen are easily distinguishable from the facts in Johnson. Mobil did not have the monopoly position enjoyed by the telephone company. Alternatives to signing the Mobil lease were available to Johnson, the most obvious
being to continue with Gulf. By contrast, the Allen court's majority
found that, realistically, Allen had no other options. Thus, Mobil
was not in as dominant a bargaining position because the Mobil
lease was simply not as vital to Johnson as the advertising was to
Allen.
Although the result in Johnson was compelled by neither the
facts nor Michigan law, Johnson was excused by the court from the
limitation to which he had manifested assent. This was not a case
where the plaintiff needed special protection from the unforeseen
consequences of his own improvidence. Johnson faced a loss of
money, the most universally recognized risk involved in any contract.
Moreover, extrapolation from the Weaver situation was inappropriate, since the strong societal interest in protection from and compensation for personal injury was absent.
In essence, Johnson builds on the preceding service station cases
to create a special class of commercial plaintiffs: the semiliterate
service station operator. To get out from under a burdensome lease
arrangement, an individual within this class need only show that he
did not read the proffered form and could not have understood the
188. Allen v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 61 Mich. App. 62, 232 N.W.2d 302 (1975).
189. See id. at 66, 232 N.W.2d at 304.
190. Id. (quoting Allen v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 383 Mich. 804 (1970)).
191. See id. at 67, 232 N.W.2d at 305. The judge who had dissented from the
original opinion reiterated his disagreement with it in a concurring opinion, stating
that he did not feel bound by the earlier decision. See id. at 70, 232 N.W.2d at 306.
192. See notes 187-191 supra and accompanying text.
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language at issue if he had read it. He need show nothing about the
actual bargaining position of the parties; he need not allege any
objectionable conduct on the part of his lessor; he need not even show
that he did not understand the import of the language. Under the
Johnson court's analysis, large business entities wishing to contract
with members of this protected class must assume the burden of
being sure these individuals understand their agreements, regardless
of whether such assistance is requested or even desired.
In holding as it did, the Johnson court seems to have expanded
the class of individuals to whom contractual incapacity traditionally
extends to include those who sign forms without being able to understand them unaided. Now, like infants, 11 they may disaffirm contracts binding on the other party, yet retain the benefits. To avoid
this result, the other party must take affirmative action to give advice
and be sure that the advice is understood. The model of arms'-length
bargaining, with each side only obliged not to mislead, is rejected in
favor of quasi-fiduciary responsibility.194 The drafting party must not
only isolate those provisions that might be especially important to the
other, but he also bears the burden of explaining them and obtaining
actual assent. It is not enough that the crucial provisions are set forth
in the printed contract; the courts in Johnson and Weaver expressly
rejected that approach. In these cases, even conspicuous' 5 placement
of the term in question would probably not have constituted sufficient notice, since neither Weaver nor Johnson had made any effort
to read any of the contract language. What these courts appear to
have in mind is an oral explanation, pitched on a level that the
individual dealer will clearly comprehend.
Unless there is a compelling reason to intervene in the bargaining
process, such a negotiation model seems ill-advised. Although it ensures that parties to contracts will enter them with their eyes open,
it may not reach that result efficiently. To satisfy the Supreme Court
of Indiana, every oil company representative will need a short course
on the legal implications of the form lease. A checklist of points will
have to be prepared, phrased so that the least educated member of
the community will have no difficulty understanding it. The most
remote and horrible possibilities will have to be discussed so that the
assumption of risk will be informed and complete. In short, the oil
193. See RESTATEMENT

OF CoNTRACTS

§ 431, Comment b (1932).

194. Harold Brown has argued that the franchise relationship should be recognized as imposing fiduciary duties on the dominant franchisor. See Brown, supra note
26. At least one court has agreed, although that result was later reversed on appeal.
See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rubenfeld, 72 Misc. 2d 392, 339 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Civ. Ct. 1972),
affl'd, 77 Misc. 2d 962, 357 N.Y.S.2d 589 (App. Term 1974), rev'd, 48 App. Div. 2d 428,
370 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1975), aff'd mem., 40 N.Y.2d 936, 358 N.E.2d 882, 390 N.Y.S.2d 57
(1976).
195. See U.C.C. § 1-201(10).
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company will be forced to offer not only the document itself, but an
exhaustive explanation and explication of it.
Information of this sort is not costless. Any oil company that
redesigns its leasing practices as these courts envision will have to
build into its rental schedule the increased training and negotiation
time its representatives will require. Rather than allowing the lessee
or prospective lessee to decide how much time and money he wishes
to devote to an exploration of the possible consequences of his agreement, all lessees will be required to pay for a standard explanation,
aimed at the lowest common denominator.
More serious than the economic effects of such a rule are the
practical ones. If the oil companies must prove actual, subjective
assent, by what method, short of truth serum, hypnosis, or lie detector tests, can they pry an admission of that assent out of a dealer who
finds it convenient to say "I didn't understand"? Surely, some objective component will have to be recognized. Perhaps if a Miranda-type
warning is read to and initialed by every prospective lessee and is
phrased in language simple enough for a semiliterate to understand,
6
even these courts will find that the lessee has understood his lease."9
But even assuming that the oil companies are successful in explaining
exculpatory or loss-limiting language, and somehow obtain informed
consent, the Marinello"7 precedent stands as a warning that the assent of the dealer, once obtained, may be suspect. Thus, if courts
continue to view dealers as helpless captives, even complete disclosure may not insulate the companies from charges of unconscionability.
Before imposing new costs and burdens of disclosure on the suppliers, courts should take care to define the societal interest at stake
and should demand special disclosure of only those clauses that directly impinge upon an interest that is compelling. Surely those
terms that allocate financial responsibility for personal injury will
merit the most careful judicial scrutiny, as the Code drafters recognized.'98 If such clauses do have legitimate business justification, the
logical step would be to demand a special effort to ensure that they
are understood, placing the responsibility on the party who can most
efficiently discharge it, which in most cases will be the drafting party.
But mandatory conspicuousness must be reserved for especially im196. Such procedures are not unprecedented. Anyone who has contracted for an
interstate move has received a booklet and an explanation of the mover's limited
liability, courtesy of the Interstate Commerce Commission. See 49 C.F.R. § 1056.7
(1977) (requiring motor common carriers engaged in transportation of household goods
to disclose specified information to prospective shippers).
197. Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973), cert. denfed,
415 U.S. 920 (1974).
198. See U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
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portant terms, since if everything must be conspicuous, nothing will
stand out.
Furthermore, assuming that maximum freedom of contract is
desirable, regulation ought to be no broader than the perceived public
interest demands. In the Weaver situation, for example, even the
Indiana Supreme Court endorsed exculpatory and indemnity provisions as useful and legitimate, so long as their implications are understood. One way to state the public interest at issue in Weaver is to
insist that if private parties are going to shift the financial burden of
accidental personal injury, the party who bears the risk must be
ready for it. If that is the nature of the public interest, rather than
some abstract notion of fairness, then the approach of the intermediate Indiana appellate court has much to commend it.
The intermediate court examined the commercial setting, looking at the transaction not in isolation but in context, as the Code
would mandate. Finding that the party to whom the risk of third
party injury had been assigned would not have stood unprepared for
the burden to be imposed if he had followed the standard commercial
practice of buying insurance, the court declared the public interest
satisfied. In other words, since the business community had provided
for insurance coverage that dovetailed with the contractual risk
allocation, the dealer was protected, whether or not he ever read his
forms. In unconscionability terms, therefore, any surprise was immaterial and not unfair. By contrast, the court found the risk of personal
injury to the dealer resulting from the supplier's negligence, which
the dealer had assumed under the contract, to be serious and unusual, since one would not routinely insure against it. Private arrangements had failed to provide the protection against uncompensated
personal injury to the dealer himself that the public interest demands. Accordingly, the duty to read, which no longer fits the perceived reality of standard form contracting, was supplanted by a duty
to disclose, imposed on the more knowledgeable party who arranged
the risk allocations in the first place.
In Weaver, both the intermediate and supreme courts found the
contractual arrangement under consideration to be so unfair to one
of the contracting parties as to be unconscionable. In general, however, courts should be wary of regulating the terms of bargains, unless
there is good reason to do so, in order to leave individuals the widest
possible latitude to make their own value judgments in contractual
matters. As a start, it might be prudent to follow the lead of the Code
and separate those situations that involve personal injury from those
where only commercial loss occurs;"' Johnson would thus be treated
199. See id.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:813

as a case very different from Weaver. Perhaps, where only money is
at stake, the legal system can safely rely on the prospective lessee's
self-interest, combined with the self-interest of the insurance companies that stand to gain by informing him about his risks, to safeguard
individual dealers against unfair risk allocation.
The costs of indiscriminately expanding the "incapacity" of the
legally unsophisticated are obvious. Imposing on oil company suppliers the duty of overcoming, through full and complete disclosure,
the dealer's perceived lack of sophistication shifts the burden of recognizing legal problems to the oil company, relieves the would-be
dealer of any responsibility to safeguard his own interests by consulting independent counsel, and drives up the cost of doing business for
everyone. These costs seem especially burdensome if what is really
behind decisions such as Weaver and Johnson is not a fundamental
objection to the failure to disclose in the bargaining process but
rather a deep-seated judicial distaste for exculpatory clauses.
It may be that the courts feel, as a matter of public policy, that
those who reap the greatest profits from the sale of gasoline, a dangerous commodity, ought to be held strictly liable for all losses that
result. 1 Decisions like Weaver"' and Johnson,212 however, obfuscate
that policy choice by introducing considerations of how much and
what kind of bargaining went on regarding exculpatory or losslimiting clauses. If the loss should be placed on the oil companysupplier because of risk-spreading considerations, it would make
more sense to pursue this objective directly and overtly, rather
than appearing to validate liability-shifting clauses provided true
assent is somehow achieved. If the courts' real objection is to the
harshness inherent in exculpatory clauses of the type at issue in
Weaver, then even if the oil company were to obtain knowing assent
by the dealer, that assent would surely be attacked as illusory because the signer had only two options: to sign or to forgo being a
gasoline dealer.2 0 3 In other words, if not surprising, the term would
almost certainly be found to be oppressive. That being the case, and
if allocation of losses to the deepest pocket is the operative social
policy, it would make more sense and cause less confusion regarding
200. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 77, at 505 (4th
ed. 1971).
201. Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971).
202. Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
203. Clearly, Frank Marinello was not surprised to discover he had signed a
three-year lease, but the New Jersey court decreed that his lessor could not reserve the
right to recover its property without sufficient reason to convince a court that it had
cause to end its relationship with Marinello. See notes 87-113 supra and accompanying
text.
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the status of all standard form contracts if the courts were candid
about the basis for their decisions.
V.

CONCLUSION

The major criticism of the courts that have faced unconscionability claims by service station operators is that they have failed
to consider them in full context. Fault probably lies with the oil companies, which have not effectively presented their side of the story,
preferring to narrow the issue as much as possible. But courts operating in the atmosphere fostered by the Code are obliged to immerse
themselves in the commercial setting before passing judgment on
contract terms. If the charge is oppression, more care should be devoted to an assessment of the reasons for a clause: in the franchise
situation, ability to protect system-wide goodwill by terminating substandard dealers is critical. Perhaps commercial necessity, not oppression, requires that dealers bear the risk of a mistaken judgment
to terminate in order to protect the common interest of both dealers
and supplier in eliminating substandard franchisees.
Essential as the context is when oppression is alleged, that context is no less important when the claim is fine-print unfair surprise.
More effort is needed to identify the agreement in fact to be sure that
the challenged term is truly unexpected." 4 Even if it is, other commercial arrangements may have taken the sting out of it, removing
the harshness or unfairness that should be a prerequisite for governmental intervention.0 5 Where the effect is both harsh and unexpected, more thought ought to be given to whether a duty to disclose is workable, provable, and worth the extra costs it would require. Perhaps more candor is required for forbid the risk allocation
outright; the duty-to-disclose approach may merely encourage litigation over whether binding assent has been achieved.
These four cases show that some gasoline retailers have enlisted
new allies in their long-running battle with their lessor-suppliers, the
oil companies. Judges, armed with the power to refuse enforcement
of unconscionable terms, have entered the lists on the side of the
lessees. Thus far, it appears that the oil companies have not been
eager to expand litigation involving delinquent dealers into a fullblown defense. of their marketing and leasing practices, and their
reluctance is certainly understandable. But, faced with the fact that
resourceful dealers can now point to cases already decided as precedent, the oil companies may soon be forced to present their counterarguments.
204.
205.

See Murray, supranote 4, at 15.
See id. at 24-25.
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In presenting their case, the oil companies will have to overcome
the sympathy accorded to David taking on Goliath. But they should
remind courts that bigness in and of itself is not proof of overwhelming bargaining power. Before presuming that oil companies can extract unconscionable agreements from defenseless operators, or can
operate in bad faith with impunity, the courts ought to look closely
at the realities of the marketplace, which may demonstrate that particular dealers are indeed sought after and enjoy considerable bargaining power in their own right. Furthermore, unlike consumers,
gasoline station operators are not an atomized group, but are already
well-organized and politically active. Other branches of government,
responsive to political pressure, may be and have been moved to
extend protection." 6 Judges assessing the relative bargaining position
of operators and their lessors need to be reminded that the dealers'
political clout represents potential, if not actual, bargaining power
that consumers do not have.21 Thus, an unthinking extension to this
group of the special judicial protection traditionally afforded helpless
consumers is not only unwarranted but undesirable.
206. In fact, in June 1978, Congress gave dealers a "day in court" on questions
of termination. The Federal Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-297,
92 Stat. 322 (1978), prohibits a franchisor from terminating or failing to renew a
franchise unless there is "cause" as specified in the statute. See id. § 102.
The act, however, may not yield a significant change from prior law. For instance,
it provides that termination is lawful if the franchisor can show "a failure by the
franchisee to comply with any provision of the franchise." Id. § 102(b)(2) (A). Although
it is too early to predict the effect the legislation will have, it does seem fair to say
that an unconscionability analysis will have to be undertaken to separate "reasonable"
from "unreasonable" contract terms.
207. As a case in point, the four decisions examined in this Article demonstrate
the success of gasoline dealers and their organizations in improving their position
vis-a-vis their suppliers. The dealers' arguments have been most warmly received in
New Jersey, where the legislature has enacted a "Franchise Practices Act." See N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 56:10-1 to -12 (West Supp. 1976). The New Jersey legislative success
has been magnified by the favorable court decision in Marinello, which has been cited
in other jurisdictions. If the dealers can continue to build on these precedents, they
may, along with "the poor naive consumer confronted with high-pressure sales tactics," Spanogle, supra note 4, at 955, join "unsophisticated farmer[s], careless sailors,
the naive young, the easily defrauded oil, and the unfortunate physically disabled,"
id. at 955 n.120, as a new class of persons to whom the courts will grant special
protection. Given the dealers' recent political successes, however, this may be one
group that is able to take care of itself.

